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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal problems arising in connection with the sale or fusion of business
enterprises have led over the years to the emergence and widespread
acceptance in U.S. law of a body of jurisprudence concerned with "successor
liability." In carefully circumscribed areas, the courts have regularly applied
a series of doctrines of law that impose liability upon one juridical entity
acquiring the assets (as distinct from the stock) of a business that was
previously conducted by another juridical entity for the obligations of the
"predecessor." These doctrines, based on traditional contract law, corporate
law, and equitable jurisprudential principles, are long established and present
almost no controversial questions.'
In the past half century however, a dramatic change has occurred in this
area of law heretofore dominated by doctrines resting on formalistic and
conceptual foundations. Two unrelated factors of great jurisprudential
1. The de facto merger doctrine, expanding the traditional statutory merger exception,
represents the only area of controversy. For further discussion, see infra note 7 and
accompanying text.
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significance have led to the development of two innovative doctrines of
successorship liability with functional and pragmatic rather than conceptual
roots. These innovative doctrines, which would expand the scope of liability
well beyond the traditional doctrines, have emerged as a result of the
exploding concepts of strict liability in tort law and the sharply increased
concern for effective implementation of statutory regulatory programs.
These new doctrines, focusing on the economic realities of the enterprise
rather than on the corporate entity, are the "continuity of the enterprise" and
"the product line" doctrines. In a number of jurisdictions, courts have relied
on these doctrines to impose successor liability in product liability cases,
including application to related issues such as the amenability of a product
liability defendant to jurisdiction. In addition, courts have used the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine to broaden widely the outer bounds of
statutory liability under numerous major federal remedial statutes ranging
from labor, employment, and environmental matters to the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and tax matters.
While the product line doctrine represents only a manifestation of the
enormously expanded sweep of U.S. product liability law, the continuity of
the enterprise doctrine cannot be explained solely by reference to changing
concepts of tort law. Continuity of the enterprise has received a much wider
range of application and must be recognized as the development of a new
doctrine of relational law resting on enterprise principles. As such, it has
significant jurisprudential implications. However, it should be understood at
the outset that the doctrine has won only mixed acceptance in U.S. law, even
in the areas of its greatest success. Thus, the continuity of the enterprise
doctrine is still a minority doctrine in product liability law and still highly
controversial for purposes of environmental laws such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Furthermore, except for RICO, the labor laws, and the tax laws, the doctrine
has not significantly penetrated other areas of statutory law.
While the doctrine has won its greatest acceptance in labor relations law
and in other labor areas, such as antidiscrimination law, factory safety, and
wages and hours limitations, this triumph of relational law, in effect, occurred
decades ago. For forty years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
has applied, and the courts have accepted, enterprise principles for many
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) under the "single
employer" or "integrated enterprise" standard. The NLRB standards
substantially overlap the continuity of the enterprise doctrine. The recent
evolution of the doctrine in product liability law and in major areas of U.S.
statutory law merely builds upon this impressive foundation derived from this
development of long ago.
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II. TRADITIONAL SUCCESSORSHIP LAW
Under traditional corporation law, a corporation (the "successor") that
acquires the manufacturing facilities of another corporation (the "predeces-
sor") generally does not become liable for any of the liabilities of the
predecessor arising prior to the transfer. Product liability is no exception.2
Under traditional corporation law, a purchaser who acquires a corporate
business through the purchase of its assets normally will not become liable
for the predecessor's obligations even though acquisition of the very same
business through the purchase of its stock would have left the liability
unimpaired. Under traditional law, the use of a different form for accom-
plishing the acquisition of a business leads to a different legal result insofar
as creditors and other third parties are concerned even though the economic
posture of the purchaser and the business remain substantially unchanged.3
With courts still enthralled by nineteenth-century formalistic jurispru-
dence and focusing solely on the fact that the successor through the purchase
of assets is considered a different juridical entity, insulation from liability
results inexorably from application of entity concepts of law. Given this
preoccupation with legal forms, these courts simply ignore the most obvious
economic realities, such as the fact that in many cases, the same enterprise
or business may be involved with little or no change, except ownership.
There are five exceptions to this rigid conceptual standard, insulating a
party acquiring a business through acquisition of all its assets rather than its
stock from liability for the pre-acquisition obligations of the business.4
2. The literature is enormous. See generally 1 AM. LAW PROD. LIAB. 3d § 7 (Russell
J. Davis et al. eds., 1990 & Supp. 1995); 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-7123 (perm. ed. rev. vol.
1993); M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1988); David Morris Phillips,
Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Commercial Law Perspective,
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249 (1982-83); Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A
Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984);
Robert J. Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: Nature and Scope of Successor
Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 185 (1984);
George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58
IND. L.J. 677 (1983); Roberta L. Schuhalter, Note, Successor Liability for Defective Products:
A Tort Exception to a Corporate Rule, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1982).
3. See Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 422-31, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878-84
(1976). "[I]t seems both unfair and unbelievable that a corporate combination or acquisition
decision would be principally or exclusively made on the basis of cutting off the contingent
right to sue of a products liability victim." Id. at 880.
4. See generally 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7122. A successor's liability for
the debts of the predecessor arising before the acquisition must be distinguished from its
liability arising from its own conduct after acquisition based on its own conduct with respect
to pre-acquisition product purchasers. Thus, under traditional negligence principles, the
successor may come under a duty to warn of defects of its predecessor's products as a result
[Vol. 10
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These generally accepted exceptions are as follows:
(1) Under Contract Law: where the successor agrees, either
expressly or impliedly, to assume the liabilities of the prede-
cessor;5
(2) Under Corporation Law: where the transaction is accom-
plished through a merger or consolidation of the acquired and
acquiring corporations, as a result of which the surviving
company becomes liable by operation of law.6 In numerous
jurisdictions, the merger law has been broadened under the
doctrine of "de facto merger" to include those sales of assets
that leave the parties in much the same position as if a formal
merger had taken place;7
of the successor's own actions, such as continuing to service products that were sold before
the acquisition. See Clark Equip. Co. v. Dial Corp., 25 F.3d 1384, 1387 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Michigan law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1981); Diaz v.
South Bend Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97, 103-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (New York law) (service
contract required); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Products Liability: Corporate Successors
and the Duty to Warn, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 535 (1993).
5. Several recent cases have been concerned with whether successor corporation liability
arose as a result of contractual obligations between the parties. Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 875
F.2d 153, 153 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding contractual assumption of liability under Pennsylvania
or Illinois law); Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 576, reh'g denied, 879 F.2d 801 (10th
Cir. 1989) (denying summary judgment because post-agreement conduct of the parties,
including payment of liability insurance premiums by the successor company, presented a
material issue of fact of whether it had contractually assumed liabilities); Grugan v. BBC
Brown Boveri, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1080, 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding contractual assumption
of liability under Pennsylvania law); Earl v. Priority Key Servs., Inc., 232 Neb. 584, 441
N.W.2d 610 (1989) (successor held liable on contract under Nebraska law).
6. See 10 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 4880, 4892.75; 3 MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 11.06(a)(3) (3d ed. Supp. 1996).
7. Where one corporation is absorbed by another through the acquisition of assets for
stock distributed to the shareholders of the seller, the surviving corporation may become liable
under the de facto merger doctrine for the debts of the predecessor corporation in the same
manner as if a statutory merger had occurred. The doctrine rests on the following elements:
continuity of the business, continuity of shareholders, cessation of operation and dissolution
of the seller as soon as possible, assumption by the buyer of obligations necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of the business, and the distribution of the succssor's stock to
shareholders of the predecessor. See ALI, 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.38 cmt.a, at 41-44 (1994); 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra
note 2, §§ 7045.10, 7127; see also Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Independent Agent Ctr.,
Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that there is "no requirement that all of the events
are necessary ... at the same time"); Blizzard v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 831 F. Supp.
544, 544 (E.D. Va. 1993) (Virginia law) (no de facto merger without sale or transfer of stock);
East Prairie R-2 Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 813 F. Supp. 1396, 1396 (E.D. Mo. 1993)
(Missouri law) (no de facto merger without substantially similar ownership or control);
Howard v. APAC-Georgia, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 49, 383 S.E.2d 617, 617 (1989) (no de facto
merger without continuing identity of shareholders).
Some jurisdictions do not recognize the doctrine. See, e.g., Texas Bus. Corp. Act, TEX.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5.10, § B (West 1980); Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch.
74, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963); Director of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands,
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(3) Under Equitable Jurisprudence (Fraud): where the transaction
is a fraudulent attempt to escape liability for the obligations of
the predecessor;
8
(4) Under Equitable Jurisdiction (Sham): where there are only
negligible differences between the predecessor and successor
companies and their shareholders and management; this is
often described as the "mere continuation" doctrine;9 and
(5) Under Fraudulent Transfer Doctrines: where the assets have
been transferred without reasonably adequate consideration,
leaving insufficient assets in dissolution for the payment of
existing liabilities.'0
Successor liability under the traditional doctrines has received wide
application throughout the law. Although the various theories are prominent
in product liability law, they have been applied in entirely unrelated areas as
well. Thus, in reliance on the generally accepted traditional doctrines,
successor liability has been widely applied not only in product liability law,
but in other areas of tort liability," in contracts, 2 and in statutory liability,
including environmental laws, 3 occupational safety," and labor and
Inc., 588 A.2d 734, 736 (Me. 1991) (Maine law).
The de facto merger doctrine is applied to internal corporate matters as well. For
example, it determines the state of incorporation and governs the internal affairs of
corporations. It also determines such matters as the rights of dissenting shareholders. See
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25, 25 (1958), overruled, Act of Nov. 10,
1959, Pub. L. 1406, No. 502; 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7127.
8. E.g., Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gordon v. Axtec
Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949).
9. See Grand Labs., Inc. v. Midcon Labs, 32 F.3d 1277, 1283 (8th Cir. 1994).
10. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act §§ 3,4, 7, 7A U.L.A. 430, 448,474, 509 (1985);
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 4, 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 643, 652-53, 657 (1985); see, e.g.,
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 308-09 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1985); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Weaver v.
Nash Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Iowa 1983).
11. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438 (4th
Cir. 1990) (Virginia law); Duris v. Erato Shipping, Inc., 684 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529 (1983);
Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H. 1990); Goffe v. Blake, 605 F. Supp. 1151,
1154 (D. Del. 1985).
12. Successor liability for contract and other obligations is routinely recognized in cases
governed by the traditional successorship doctrines. E.g., Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts,
Ltd., 94 F.3d 623 (11 th Cir. 1996) (Florida law); Acme Boot Co. v. Tony Lama Interstate
Retail Stores, Inc., Nos. 90-2621, 90-2630, 90-2637, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4805, at *7 (4th
Cir. Mar. 26, 1991) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); Arnold Graphics, 775 F.2d at 38;
Tucker, 645 F.2d at 623; T.H.S. Northstar Assocs. v. W.R. Grace Co. - Conn., 840 F. Supp.
676 (D. Minn. 1993) (Minnesota law); County of Cook v. Mellon Stuart Co., 812 F. Supp.
793 (N.D. 11. 1992) (Illinois law); Hoche Productions, S.A. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F.
Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
13. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991)
(universally accepted principles of private corporate successorship law applicable to
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employment matters. 5 It is the newer innovative doctrine - the continuity
of the enterprise doctrine - that is struggling for recognition in numerous
areas of the law. The other innovative doctrine - the product line doctrine
- has received very little attention outside of the product liability area.
The established exceptions of successor liability, resting on fundamental
principles of contract law, venerable aspects of statutory law, including the
corporation and fraudulent transfer laws, and equitable intervention to
disregard legal consequences arising from fraud or sham transactions, are
unchallenged and require no comment. However, it is useful to review
briefly at the onset that aspect of equitable intervention known as the mere
continuation doctrine because of its relationship to the innovative continuity
of the enterprise doctrine.
Il. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND
THE MERE CONTINUATION DOCTRINE
The mere continuation exception rests on the conclusion that the
purported transfer is only a manipulation of corporate forms without a
sufficient change in substantive relationships to justify a change in legal
duties. Principles of equitable jurisprudence intervene to prevent a change
in legal obligations as a result of a transaction that is essentially a sham. The
doctrine, accordingly, is applicable only where the successor has the same
stockholders as the predecessor and conducts the same business with the
same management, facilities, employees, products, and trade names. There
is a common economic and entrepreneurial identity in this transaction. 6
Although in form a transfer from one corporation to another. has occurred, the
transaction is little more than a shuffling of corporate forms, lacking any
fundamental change with independent significance.
Thus, the doctrine "focuses on the continuation of management and
ownership between the predecessor and successor corporations."' 7 "'The
key element ... is a common identity of the officers, directors and
CERCLA); Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 876 F. Supp. 934, 934
(W.D. Mich. 1994) (mere continuation based on shared principals, employees, location, and
name); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (granting
summary judgment for plaintiff on liability); Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt & Chem. Co., 709
F. Supp. 556, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (denying summary judgment for defendant); Department
of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980).
14. E.g., Dole v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., 752 F. Supp. 573, 581 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (mere
continuation doctrine).
15. Preyer v. Gulf Tank & Fabricating Co., 826 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (LMRA
and Civil Rights Act).
16. See AM. LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 2, § 7.14.
17. See Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283.
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stockholders in the selling and purchasing corporations.' ,,18 The same
principals who previously had conducted a business through one controlled
corporation must be conducting the same business through a different
controlled corporation.' Even when a formal change in management and
ownership has occurred, the mere continuation doctrine will still apply where
the change is deemed a sham, for example, where the directors and
shareholders of the successor are relatives of the directors and shareholders
of the predecessor.20
Even if otherwise applicable, successorship liability will not be imposed
under this doctrine unless two other essential elements are established. First,
application of successor liability depends on the lack of availability of a
remedy against the predecessor; the doctrine is not available where the
predecessor is still in existence.2' Second, a transfer of the assets of the
business must have taken place. Thus, even where an alleged successor has
the same shareholders, same name, and conducts a related business, there can
be no successor liability where there has been no transfer of the predecessor's
assets or continuation of its manufacturing activities.22 In applying the mere
continuation doctrine, courts have rejected the "totality of the circumstances"
standard and instead have insisted that all of the necessary elements must be
established.23
With the explosive development of product liability law, numerous cases
have made it plain that application of successor liability under cases meeting
the requirements of the mere continuation doctrine is essential to implement
the underlying policies of tort law. This should be done, notwithstanding the
manipulation of corporate forms in an attempt to achieve insulation from pre-
18. Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (1lth Cir. 1985)
(quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977)); see Harris v. T.I.,
Inc., 243 Va. 63, 413 S.E.2d 605 (1992); see also East Prairie R-2 Sch. Dist., 813 F. Supp.
at 1396 (Missouri law); Taylor v. Atlas Safety Equip. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (E.D. Va.
1992) (Virginia law) (stating that continuity of shareholders and management is the "key
element" of the doctrine).
19. E.g., Bud Antle, 758 F.2d at 1458 (Georgia law); Weaver, 730 F.2d at 547 (Iowa law);
Tucker, 645 F.2d at 625-26 (Missouri law); see Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283 (Iowa law).
20. C. Mac Chambers Co. v. Iowa Tae Kwon Do Academy, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 593, 595
(Iowa 1987).
21. E.g., Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 100 (New York law); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake
Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Va. 1987); Asher v. KCS Int'l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598,
600 (Ala. 1995). This has been enforced even where the continued existence was no more
than a "gossamer," Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 100 (citing Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59
N.Y. 2d 239, 244, 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1983)), or an "empty shell," Freeman v. Complex
Computing Co., 931 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
22. E.g., Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill & Co., 68 F.3d 1443, 1443 (1st Cir. 1995); Williams
v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 1991); A.R. Teeters &
Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 172 Ariz. 324, 330, 836 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (substantial similarity of ownership and control insufficient).
23. See, e.g., Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 97; Asher, 659 So. 2d at 598.
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existing liabilities by relying on the rigid acceptance of the separate juridical
existence of separate corporations under traditional corporation law.
24
Building on the foundation of the mere continuation doctrine, some
courts have greatly expanded it to include cases in which there was no
continuity of stock, stockholders, or directors. They have done so through
two innovative alternative theories: the product line theory and the continuity
of the enterprise theory. While each of these theories has been adopted by
a number of jurisdictions, the courts are divided, and these doctrines remain
highly controversial. These new doctrines are reviewed in the following
sections.
IV. SUCCESSORSHIP IN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
A. The Product Line Doctrine
Unlike the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, as reviewed below, the
product line doctrine focuses on the continuity of the products manufactured
by the successor corporation with those of the predecessor rather than on
continuity of the operations of the business as a whole.25 "[A] party which
acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products ... assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same
product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from
which the business was acquired.,
26
Although the product line doctrine has been adopted in California, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington,27 it has been rejected by most
24. See, e.g., Poole v. Amstead Indus., Inc., No. 76-2652 (E.D. Tenn., Apr. 7, 1978),
aff'd, 575 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1978); Blizzard, 831 F. Supp. at 547-48 (Virginia law); Diaz,
707 F. Supp. at 97 (New York law); Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 541
(D. Del. 1988); Philadelphia Elec., 587 F. Supp. at 147-48; Weaver, 562 F. Supp. at 863;
Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 118, 134 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.
1981); Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chems., 518 F. Supp. 375, 380 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
25. See generally AM. LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 2, § 7.25-.31; LOUIS B. FRUMER &
MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABiLrrY § 5.06(2) at 70.58 (19)-(20) (1986); Jerry J.
Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 906
(1983); W. Edward Sell, Successor Corporation's Liability for Defective Products of Its
Transferor - The Product Line Exception, 4 J.L. & Com. 65 (1984); Paul Nugent, Note,
Products Liability - Successor Corporation Which Continues to Manufacture Predecessor's
Product Line May Be Held Strictly Liable for Personal Injuries Caused by Predecessor's
Defective Products, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 848 (1982); Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation,
Products Liability: Liability of Successor Corporation for Injury or Damage Caused by
Product Issued by Predecessor, 66 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975).
26. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 11 (1977); see DeLapp v. Xtraman,
Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 220-21 (Iowa 1987).
27. Am. LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 2, § 7.27; see, e.g., Conway v. White Trucks, 885
F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989); Ray, 560 P.2d at 3; Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co., 175 Cal.
App. 3d 445, 220 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1985) (applicable to distributors as well as manufacturers);
1996]
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jurisdictions 28 and remains a highly controversial minority view. Most
jurisdictions reject any expansion of successorship liability beyond the
confined limits of the traditional exceptions to the classic doctrine. In
addition, these jurisdictions that have been ready to broaden the traditional
law seem to prefer to rely on the "continuation of the enterprise" doctrine
instead of the product line doctrine. 29 The product line doctrine is not apt
to win any new converts.3°
The California Supreme Court first formulated and applied the product
line doctrine in its path-breaking opinion in Ray v. Alad.3' The court
justified the theory by reference to three factors:32 (1) the destruction of the
plaintiff's remedies against the predecessor, which was caused by the
transaction;33 (2) the successor's ability to spread the risk;34 (3) the fairness
of requiring the successor to assume the burden of the predecessor's defective
products along with the advantage of the goodwill being exploited through
the continued operation of the business. 35  The court noted that "[t]he
purpose of the rule of strict tort liability 'is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen
Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106, 106 (1981); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash.
2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
District court decisions adopting the doctrine under Colorado law were subsequently
overruled by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Compare Ede v. Mueller Pump Co.,
652 F. Supp. 656 (D. Colo. 1987); Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282
(D. Colo. 1984), with Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989).
28. See AM. LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 2, § 7.27 n.95 (collecting the cases and listing
more than 24 states as rejecting the doctrine); see, e.g., Florom, 867 F.2d at 570 (Colorado
law); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986) (Virgin Islands law); Travis v.
Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977) (Indiana law); Leannais, 565 F.2d at 437 (Wis-
consin law); DeLapp, 417 N.W.2d at 219 (Iowa law); Guzman v. MRM/ELGIN, 409 Mass.
563, 567 N.E.2d 929 (1991); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989);
Young v. Fulton Iron Works- Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Downtowner, Inc.
v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach.
Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d 60, 507 N.E.2d 331 (1987); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986).
29. Thus, a Michigan court applying the continuity of the enterprise doctrine noted that
Michigan does not follow the product line doctrine. See Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp.,
Ill Mich. App. 343, 355, 314 N.W.2d 614, 620 (1981).
30. One commentator has suggested that the doctrine has "fizzled out." Michael D.
Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Liability and an
Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 897, 909 (1992).
31. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (1977).
32. Id. at 8-9.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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powerless to protect themselves.' '36 Subsequently, some courts have
broadened the scope of the doctrine by not requiring that a remedy against
the predecessor be unavailable."
The imposition of liability under the product line theory is an attempt to
expand even further the concepts of enterprise liability in product liability
law. Along with product liability law generally, the product line theory is
still another example of relational law applying enterprise principles.
However, the jurisdictions accepting the doctrine have done so only in
product liability matters;3" as noted, the doctrine has not attracted further
acceptance. Accordingly, it should be regarded as a subset of product
liability law, with only limited significance for other areas of the law.
B. The Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine
Building on the traditional mere continuation exception, the continuity of
the enterprise doctrine39 is an expansive doctrine, which would enforce
liability in the successorship area by focusing on the continuity of the
business without requiring continuity of the shareholders and management.
It is an innovative doctrine of enterprise liability and relational law; so long
as the same business is involved, the liabilities of a business run with the
business, notwithstanding a change in ownership. The doctrine emerged in
response to a perceived need for the further expansion of available remedies
in product liability law. It also reflects the growing emergence of enterprise
principles in U.S. commercial law in general.40 Like the product line
36. Id. at 8 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901 (1963)).
37. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826, 828 (1981);
cf. Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 322 N.W.2d 14, 18 (1982) (mere
continuation).
38. E.g., Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283; Florom, 867 F.2d at 578. Department of Transp.
v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980) (New Jersey Spill Act)
(alternate holding), appears to be an exception.
39. The continuity of the enterprise doctrine also has been termed the "substantial
continuity" doctrine, the "continuing business enterprise" doctrine, and the "substantial
continuation" doctrine. These terms are entirely interchangeable. This article will use "the
continuity of the enterprise."
40. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1983) [hereinafter
BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES (1985) [hereinafter
BLUMBERG, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1987) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW
PROBLEMS]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION (1989)
[hereinafter BLUMBERG, GENERAL STATUTORY LAW]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & K. STRASSER,
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doctrine, the continuity of the enterprise doctrine is highly controversial.
Adopted for common-law product liability purposes by a limited number of
jurisdictions, including Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio, 1 it has
been rejected in most jurisdictions."
The continuity of the enterprise doctrine is the most advanced stage in
the evolution of strict liability concepts in product liability law. It was first
heralded in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, applying New Hampshire law. 43  In Turner v. Bituminous
Casualty Co., the Supreme Court of Michigan launched the doctrine as a new
exception resting firmly on its own footing." The court looked upon the
doctrine as a component of product liability law rather than of corporate law
that gave rise to a cause of action "where the totality of the transaction
demonstrates a basic continuity of . [an unchanged] enterprise.,,4' The
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
UNDER STATUTORY LAW SPECIFICALLY APPLYING ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES (1992) [hereinafter
BLUMBERG & STRASSER, SPECIFIC STATUTORY LAW]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & K. STRASSER,
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
UNDER STATE STATUTORY LAW (1995) [hereinafter BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATE
STATUTORY LAW].
41. See, e.g., Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chems., 518 F. Supp. 375, 381 (M.D. Tenn. 1981)
(Ohio law); Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349, 350-51 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455-56 (D.S.C. 1977); Turner v.
Wean United, Inc., 531 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 1988); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 771-72
(Ala. 1983); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); McGaw
v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 74 Ohio App.3d 8, 13, 598 N.E.2d 18, 21 (1991); see also Cyr v.
B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (New Hampshire law); Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d
at 336 (impliedly adopting doctrine according to McGaw, 74 Ohio App. 3d at 11, 598 N.E.2d
at 20).
New York law is undecided. The court of appeals has left the question open.
Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195 (1983); see Carol L. Van
Scoyoc, Note, Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.: A Warning to Successor Corporations, 4
PACE L. REV. 457 (1984). The lower courts are divided. Compare Radziul v. Hooper, Inc.,
125 Misc. 2d 362, 365, 479 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe Cty. 1984) (rejecting
doctrine), with Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 130 Misc. 2d 626, 630-32,
497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1985) (applying doctrine).
42. See, e.g., Florom, 867 F.2d at 570 (Colorado Law); Polius, 802 F.2d at 75 (Virgin
Islands law); Weaver, 730 F.2d at 547 (Iowa law); Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 630,
594 A.2d 564, 572 (Ct. App. 1991); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 310, 376
N.W.2d 820, 829 (1985).
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 15
(Proposed Final Draft 1997), which has been approved by the American Law Institute
membership, rejects the doctrine for the courts, concluding the problem was better resolved
by legislation than judicial decision.
43. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1145.
44. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 873. Turner followed a similar decision in Cyr, 501 F.2d at
1145, which also relied on the policy reasons for strict liability in tort to go beyond the mere
continuation doctrine and find successor liability although continuity of ownership was
lacking. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 881.
45. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 873.
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court relied on four elements as essential for the imposition of liability under
the doctrine:
1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise... including...
key personnel, assets, general business operations, and ... name.
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations,
liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration ....
3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of
the normal business operations of the seller corporation.
4) The purchasing corporation held itself out... as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation.'
While mere continuation emphatically requires continuity of management
and shareholders, the continuity of the enterprise exception eliminates this
element entirely and focuses on the continuation of business operations. This
doctrine builds on the traditional and more limited mere continuation
exception by imposing successor liability in reliance on substantial economic
identity between the business operations of the successor and predecessor
corporations.
Unlike the mere continuation doctrine in which all elements are essential
for application, the continuity of the enterprise doctrine typically relies on the
totality of the circumstances, focusing on elements such as the use of the
same employees, facilities, location, products, and trade name, as well as the
successor holding itself out as a continuation of the previous enterprise."7
Thus, the continuity of the enterprise doctrine represents an unusual form
of enterprise law. Much like covenants running with the land in real
property law, under the doctrine, the liabilities of the business run along with
the business even when the business is conducted by a successor juridical
entity that lacks any ownership or management links to the predecessor.
Enterprise liability under the continuity of the enterprise doctrine of
successor liability presents novel features. Unlike under enterprise liability
that binds parent and subsidiary corporations, the parties are not linked by the
existence of common equity ownership. Unlike under enterprise liability that
binds franchisor and franchisee, or licensor and licensee, or principal and
agent, the parties are not linked by contract or consent in a continuing
relationship. Unlike both of these areas, the doctrine does not involve a
46. Id. at 883-84. Other decisions adopting the theory have generally followed Turner
to the point of quoting its standards in haec verba. See, e.g., Pietz v. Orthopedic Equip. Co.,
562 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 1989); Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 So. 2d 827, 830 (Ala. 1987).
47. See Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283; Polius, 608 F. Supp. at 1541; Andrews v. John
Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979); Pelc, 314 N.W.2d at 619. Contra Asher
v. KCS Int'l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1983).
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dominant and a subservient party under the former's control, collectively
conducting integrated fragments of a common enterprise. It is a unique
development of enterprise liability in which the legal obligations of one
juridical entity are imposed on a completely independent juridical entity,
linked only by their successive roles in conducting the same economic
enterprise. In the jurisdictions and areas of the law in which the doctrine has
been accepted, it represents an additional example of importance in
illustrating the acceptance of enterprise doctrines in U.S. law.
Seeking to provide an equitable solution to the problems presented by
product injuries to workers and consumers, this theory, like the product line
doctrine, had its roots in tort law.4" The continuing evolution of the
doctrine, however, did not stop there. Successor liability, through application
of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, has not been confined to product
liability. Although some courts in jurisdictions that have accepted the
doctrine have limited its application to product liability matters,4 9 others
have refused to do so. Similarly, many federal courts, proceeding as a matter
of federal common law, have relied widely on the doctrine in imposing
successor liability under environmental laws." Accordingly, unlike the
product line doctrine, the continuity of the enterprise doctrine cannot be
dismissed as simply another manifestation of the explosive growth of strict
liability in product liability law.
In brief, this innovative doctrine represents the impatience of some
courts, in the face of powerful public pressures, with businesses that
manipulate the corporate structure in an effort to obtain insulation from
liability under traditional principles of corporation law. For example, in
Bonee v. L & M Construction Chemicals, the court stated in blunt terms:
"Because the policy in products liability cases is to spread among society the
risk of loss from defective products, the traditional corporation law rule was
irrelevant."'"
48. See Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 73 n.2 (3d Cir.
1993); Polius, 802 F.2d at 78-79; Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877-78.
49. E.g., City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 1994)
(not available under CERCLA); Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283-84 (not available in action
alleging misappropriation of trade secrets).
50. See cases cited infra notes 115-17. Other courts have refused to do so. See cases
cited infra notes 127-30.
51. Bonee, 518 F. Supp. at 380 (continuation of the enterprise).
The irrelevance of corporation law principles was eloquently stated in Ramirez, 86 N.J.
at 341, 431 A.2d at 815-16 (product line):
[T]he traditional corporate approach has been sharply criticized as being inconsistent
with the rapidly developing principles of strict liability in tort and unresponsive to
the legitimate interests of the products liability plaintiff. Courts have come to
recognize that the traditional rule of nonliability was developed not in response to
the interests of parties to products liability actions, but rather to protect the rights
(Vol. 10
CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE
V. THE CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE:
CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION
Reflecting the radical nature of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine
of successor liability overriding traditional principles of corporation law, the
courts adopting the doctrine typically have attempted to restrict its application
to situations in which the plight of the injured party is most compelling. In
a manner of speaking, the doctrine is strong medicine to be used only in
extremis when the law would otherwise be unable to provide any remedy to
an innocent victim.
In its original formulation of the doctrine, the Turner decision identified
four significant factors." As noted, these four elements are: the basic
continuity of the business as a matter of economic reality; the liquidation and
dissolution of the seller; the buyer's assumption of the seller's obligations
necessary for the conduct of continued operations; and the buyer holding
itself out as the effective continuation of the seller.13 Subsequently, some
of the courts accepting the new doctrine restricted its application by
introducing two other major limitations: the unavailability of a remedy
against the predecessor caused by the acquisition54 and the completeness of
the transfer of the predecessor's assets.55
The courts applying the doctrine have insisted on such limitations for
application of the doctrine in varying degrees, depending on both the
jurisdiction in question and the area of law involved. The standards for
product liability are more demanding than those for purposes of statutory
law; and in statutory law, the standards appear more demanding under some
statutory programs than others. In sum, the doctrine takes on different shapes
in order to implement more effectively the underlying purposes of the law in
the particular area under consideration.
There is still another area of complexity to consider. Within various
areas of subject matter, the courts are not uniform in their application of the
doctrine. The courts divided on the question of whether the existence of
each of the elements identified by Turner and the other courts in their use of
of commercial creditors and dissenting stockholders following corporate acquisitions,
as well as to determine successor corporation liability for tax assessments and
contractual obligations of the predecessor.
Id.; see also Terry, 527 F. Supp. at 134; Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877-78.
52. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879.
53. Id. Alabama cases have indicated that holding out, by itself, may be sufficient. E.g.,
Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 788-89 (Ala. 1984); Andrews, 369 So. 2d
at 785.
54. Compare cases cited infra notes 65-67.
55. Compare cases cited infra notes 69-71.
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the doctrine is necessary for its application. A number of cases adopting the
doctrine for product liability purposes have so held.56 In this respect, these
decisions reach the same view as many other courts in applying the
traditional mere continuation doctrine. 7
Other courts applying the continuation of the enterprise doctrine are not
in agreement with this view. In sharp contrast, they have concluded that
successorship liability under the continuity of the enterprise doctrine rests on
the totality of the circumstances. While such courts take each of the factors
thus identified into account, at the end of the day, they hold that liability may
be imposed even if one or more of the factors is lacking. 8 Thus, even a
Michigan court has read Turner flexibly, stating that "continuity [of the
business] alone is the test. 59
This discussion is confined to the application of the doctrine in product
liability matters. As will be reviewed infra, very different standards apply
with respect to the elements required for application of the continuity of the
enterprise doctrine under antidiscrimination and environmental statutes.
A. Unavailability of Remedy Against Predecessor
The various doctrines of successorship liability exhibit interesting
differences concerning whether the unavailability of a remedy against the
predecessor company is a prerequisite for relief against the successor. These
variations in outcome reflect, in part, the particular doctrine being applied
and in part, the area of law under consideration. There is no clear doctrinal
rule available.
The traditional mere continuation remedy appears to be the most severe
doctrine. In applying this doctrine to impose successorship liability, the
courts have widely held that the unavailability of an effective remedy against
the selling company was an essential condition for the imposition of liability
against the buyer. The seller must be out of business, without assets, and not
amenable to service. A cause of action against the successor must constitute
the only available remedy for the injured victim.6 ° For these courts, the
56. E.g., Asher, 659 So. 2d at 598.
57. See cases cited supra note 23 (establishing that all the necessary elements must be
established for the mere continuation doctrine to apply).
58. E.g., Koretz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136, 143-44 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
Haney v. Bendix Corp., 88 Mich. App. 747, 750-51, 279 N.W.2d 544, 546 (1979). But see
Asher, 659 So. 2d at 598; Pietz v. Orthopedic Equip. Co., 562 S.W.2d 152 (Ala. 1989); Turner
v. Wean, 531 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 1988).
59. Haney, 279 N.W.2d at 546 (asset acquisition for cash) (stating that requirements in
Turner are only a guideline); see Trimper v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
60. For application of the mere continuance doctrine see, e.g., Santa Maria v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 859 (1st Cir. 1986) (New York law); Tucker, 645 F.2d at 623
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successorship remedy under the mere continuation doctrine is available only
to avoid a systemic failure of the law which would otherwise deny an injured
party any remedy against anyone.
The product line decisions are oddly divided. Some courts have
restricted application of the product line doctrine even more severely than do
the courts applying the mere continuation doctrine. These courts have held
that dissolution or other unavailability of the seller must have been caused
by the buyer's acquisition rather than by some extraneous cause. 61  Thus,
in several cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, under California
law, has restricted application of the product line theory by requiring an
essential causal relationship between the unavailability of a remedy and the
acquisition by the successor company.62  Other courts, however, have
required only that the asset sale contributed to the destruction of the victim's
remedies.63
(Missouri law); Travis, 565 F.2d at 443 (Indiana law); Weaver, 562 F. Supp. at 860; McCarthy
v. Litton Indus., Inc., 410 Mass. 15, 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1009 (1991); see Diaz, 707 F. Supp
at 100 (New York law). In Diaz, the court imposed liability under the de factor merger
doctrine after holding the availability of a remedy against the predecessor prevented
application of liability under the mere continuation doctrine. Id. at 97, 100.
For application of the product line doctrine, see, e.g., LaFountain v. Webb Indus. Corp.,
951 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1991) (Pennsylvania law) (holding that the lack of remedy against
predecessor required for product line liability was not established); Conway v. White Trucks,
885 F.2d at 90 (3d Cir. 1989) (Pennsylvania law); Santa Maria, 808 F.2d at 848; Diaz, 707
F. Supp. at 97 (applying New York law to deny liability of second successor based on product
line theory where the first successor was available and liable under the mere continuation
theory); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86
N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. 479 (Pa. C.P. 1994); see also
AM. LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 2, §§ 7.28-.29; cf. Proposed Model Uniform Product
Liability Act § 105(C) (1978) (nonmanufacturers strictly liable where manufacturers are
beyond jurisdiction, and insolvent, or the plaintiffs otherwise are unable to enforce judgment
against them).
61. Conway, 885 F.2d at 97 (Pennsylvania law); Santa Maria, 808 F.2d at 859 (stating
that requirement is "crystal clear"); Nelson v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 778 F.2d 533, 537-38 (9th
Cir. 1985); Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984); Tracey v.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F. Supp. 1099, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1990), ajfd without op.,
928 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. 91, 92-93 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258, 266, 692 P.2d 787, 792 (1984).
62. See, e.g., Nelson 778 F.2d at 537-38 (finding that bankruptcy, not the purchase of the
product line, destroyed the plaintiff's remedies and therefore, the product line doctrine is not
available); Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc., I Cal. App. 4th 190, 199, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
669, 676 (1991) (holding that the corporate purchaser of most of debtor manufacturer's assets
is not liable as successor for injuries, absent a causal connection between the purchase and the
destruction of remedies against the debtor). But see Kline, 745 F.2d at 1220; Goncalves v.
Wire Techn. & Mach., 253 N.J. Super. 327, 601 A.2d 780, 783 (Law Div. Oct. 25, 1991)
(purchase of significant portion of the manufacturer's assets in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings "causes" destruction of plaintiffs remedies against original
manufacturer and the corporate purchaser is liable as sucessor).
63. Kline, 745 F.2d at 1220; In re Related Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. at 92-93; Nieves,
431 A.2d at 826.
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A minority of jurisdictions follow a different course. They have
recognized successor liability under the product line doctrine even when the
predecessor company was available to be sued by the plaintiff.'
Courts applying the continuity of the enterprise doctrine appear to be the
most expansive. Where this doctrine has been accepted, the courts have
widely upheld the imposition of liability although a remedy against the
predecessor was still available.65 A few courts, however, still find unavail-
ability of a remedy essential for the application of this doctrine.66
The experience in applying successorship doctrines in statutory matters
also is mixed. In some statutory areas, including the antidiscrimination
statutes, the courts have disagreed on whether the unavailability of a remedy
against the predecessor is essential for successorship relief under the statute.
However, numerous courts have asserted that the "totality" of the circum-
stances should govern and that no particular factor, including unavailability
of another remedy, is essential.67
The area of environmental law is a clear exception. For a successorship
remedy under the environmental laws, the totality of the circumstances
standard prevails. Most courts have held that the need for implementation
of the underlying statutory policies and objectives of CERCLA requires the
application of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, even where not all of
the factors specified by Turner for successorship for product liability
purposes had been established.68
64. For application of the product line doctrine,'see, e.g, Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 350;
Haney, 279 N.W.2d at 546 (stating that "[t]he availability of ... transferor ... is simply a
factor'); Nieves, 431 A.2d at 826 (predecessor and successor jointly liable); Tift v. Forage
King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982); see Phillips, supra note 25, at 928-
29. But see Roe, supra note 2, at 1589 n.77.
The law in Pennsylvania appears confused. Compare Lacy v. Carrier Corp., Corp.
Guide 84,886.32 (Aspen Law & Bus.) (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1996) (Pennsylvania law); Gibson
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1538 (D. Colo. 1986) (Pennsylvania law);
Amader v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Pennsylvania law),
and Dauti v. George J. Meyer Mfg. Co., No. CIV.A.91-277, 1991 WL 135089, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. July 15, 1991) (Pennsylvania law) (loss of remedy is essential), with LaFountain, 951 F.2d
at 544 (Pennsylvania law), and Tracey, 745 F. Supp. at 1099 (acquisition by sucessor
corporation must have contributed to loss of remedy).
In addition, the courts imposing successorship liability on cases involving the sale of
a division have implicitly rejected dissolution of the transferor as a condition. See Trimper,
436 F. Supp. at 349; Haney, 279 N.W.2d at 544.
65. Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985) (Mississippi law);
Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 350; Tiff, 322 N.W.2d at 14.
66. E.g., LaFountain, 951 F.2d at 544 (Pennsylvania law).
67. See, e.g., Criswell v. Delta Airlines, 868 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1989);
Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750 (7th Cir. 1985); Bates v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 744 F.2d 705, 709 (1984) (antidiscrimination).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 489-90 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. (E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd 978
F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992).
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A final note. Intervening insolvency presents a conflict between the
underlying state tort law policies and national bankruptcy policies, raising the
issue of federal preemption. This is discussed infra in part XIU.
B. Extent of Transfer and Use of Transferred Assets
The courts also divide over the extent to which the assets of a
predecessor's business must have been transferred in order to bring into play
the modem continuity of the enterprise and product line doctrines, as well as
the traditional de facto merger and mere continuation doctrines.
Some courts, thus, require that substantially all assets must be trans-
ferred.6 9 In their view, this element is simply another aspect of the
requirement that for successorship to occur, an acquisition must eliminate the
availability of any remedy from the predecessor.70 Other courts have held
that the transfer of the assets of a single division of the predecessor suffices
where the defective product is produced by that division. However, the
courts in general are divided on the issue.71 Similarly, disagreement also
has arisen as to whether continuance in the general line of business suffices
if the successor no longer produces the precise line of products that caused
injury to the plaintiff.72
In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., a case arising under
CERCLA, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the successor-
ship doctrine was inapplicable where the transferred assets are integrated into
the purchaser's former operations rather than used to conduct a business
substantially identical to that conducted by the seller."
C. Assumption of Other Liabilities
The acquiring corporation's assumption of the liabilities of the predeces-
sor corporation "ordinarily necessary for the continuation of normal business
operations" is another element emphasized in Turner.74 Other courts
69. E.g., George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 588, 733 P.2d 507, 510 (1987); Hall
v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 792 (Wash. 1984).
70. See Hall, 692 P.2d at 792.
71. Compare Gibson, 648 F. Supp. at 1541, Amader, 546 F. Supp. at 1036 (recognizing
liability), Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 349, and Haney, 279 N.W.2d at 544, with Argo v.
Perfection Prod. Co., 730 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (N.D. Ga.), affid 935 F.2d 1295 (1lth Cir.
1991), and Shorb v. Airco, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 923, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (rejecting liability).
72. Compare Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver. Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1979) (continuing in the same line not essential), with George, 733 P.2d at 511 (continuance
of general business not in same line insufficient).
73. 909 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1990).
74. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 884.
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applying the product line7" and the continuity of the enterprise76 doctrines
for product liability purposes also have referred to this element. No product
liability decision, however, appears to have rejected liability simply because
this element has not been satisfied. Nor does this element appear to play any
role in the consideration of statutory successor liability in statutory law.
D. Absence of an Arm 's-Length Transaction
Where the transfer is between related parties or otherwise does not appear
to have taken place at arm's length, and particularly where such a transfer
does not involve the successor's payment of equivalent consideration for the
assets, the bona fides of the transaction become questionable. In the
fraudulent transfer area, for example, such characteristics are accepted as
badges of fraud.77 The presence of such suspicious elements is a powerful
factor in furthering the imposition of successor liability and dilutes the impact
of doctrinal limitations that might otherwise be decisive.78 As one commen-
tator has suggested, application of successorship liability under such
circumstances merely offsets the economic advantage of the purchaser's
having paid less than fair value for the business.79
Although the questionable circumstances of such "insider" transactions
facilitate the imposition of successorship liability, it is clear that such factors
are not a requirement for the imposition of successorship liability under the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine. The continuity doctrine has received
wide application imposing successor liability on unrelated purchasers who
have acquired a business in arm's-length transactions involving payment of
full value.
E. The Successor Holding Itself Out as
the Predecessor s Successor
The successor's actions in holding itself out as the continuation of the
predecessor in its operation of the acquired business was one of the four
factors listed in Turner as contributing to the continuity of the enterprise
75. Asher, 659 So. 2d at 598; Turner v. Wean, 531 So. 2d 827, 827 (Ala. 1988) ("strong
indicator" of continuity).
76. Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 350; Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785-86; Powers, 287 N.W.2d
at 412.
77. See, e.g., Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1984); In re DeLorean
Motor Co., 39 B.R. 157 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); see also 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY: BANKRUPTCY CODE §§ 541-560, at § 548.04(2)(b) (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. rev. 1996).
78. Cf. Ray, 560 P.2d at 3 (product line doctrine).
79. See Green, supra note 30, at 906-07.
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doctrine. 0 Other decisions have similarly given this element emphasis as
an important factor in the imposition of liability."1 However, no other court
has suggested that it is an indispensable factor, and at least one court has
expressly held that it is not an essential factor.8 2
VI. THE CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE IN
COMMON LAW MATTERS GENERALLY
Public concern about the availability of legal remedies to the numerous
U.S. consumers and workers injured by dangerously defective products has
provided the pressures necessary for the creation of expanded remedies in
product liability law. These pressures do not exist in other common law
areas, and accordingly, the question arises as to the validity of the application
of doctrines that were developed in response to concerns arising from product
liability to other common law areas.
The limited success of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine illustrates
the general reluctance of the courts to go beyond traditional concepts of
remedy. In the last analysis, the courts accepting the doctrine have done so
because of the public pressure and the need for recognition of the remedy in
order to achieve effective implementation of the underlying policies and
objectives of the law in the area. This helps explain the widespread
acceptance of the continuity doctrine in areas of statutory law such as the
environmental statutes and its emergence in a number of jurisdictions in
product liability matters.
Tort matters that do not involve product liability and contract matters are
very different. They do not present the same public pressures for creation of
a remedy. Thus, numerous courts have stated that the continuity of the
enterprise doctrine applies only to product liability issues. 3
Traditional concepts of successorship apply generally throughout the law,
including contract law 84 and tort matters not involving product liability.8 5
80. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 882-83.
81. E.g., Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 350; Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785-86; Powers, 92 Mich.
App. at 667.
82. E.g., Pelc, 314 N.W.2d at 619.
83. E.g., City Management, 43 F.3d at 244 (CERCLA); Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283
(misappropriation of trade secrets); Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Co., 67 Ohio St. 3d 344, 617
N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (1993) (contract).
84. See, e.g., Inter-Americas Ins. Corp. v. Xycor Sys., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Kan.
1991); Goffe v. Blake, 605 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Del. 1985); see Explosives Corp. v. Garlam
Enterprises Corp., 615 F. Supp. 364 (D.P.R. 1985); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Shaffer Stores
Co., 240 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1965); Payne-Baber Coal Co. v. Butler, 276 Ky. 211, 215, 123
S.W.2d 273, 275 (1938) (absence of consideration); Armour Handcrafts, Inc. v. Miami
Decorating & Design Center, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 607, 99 A.D.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1984); Cab-
Tek, Inc. v. E.B.M., Inc., 153 Vt. 432, 571 A.2d 671 (1990) (de facto merger).
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This is sound because traditional standards, such as an express or implied
assumption of liabilities, or fraud, or merger (or de facto merger), or mere
continuation, rest on the successor's own acts, or because the merger statute
so contemplates.
In contrast, the modem doctrines that expand successor liability concepts,
such as the continuity of the enterprise and product line doctrines, rest not
on contract or statutory edict but on the strength of the pressures on the
common law to provide a remedy. Among other factors, this turns on the
interrelation of the parties in the succeeding conduct of the business and its
impact on third parties. Liability, if it exists under these doctrines, rests on
status not on contract or sovereign statutory command.
In contract matters, there are no urgent, public considerations pressing the
courts to supplement the remedies traditionally available to the plaintiff.
Thus, in Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies, the leading case in this
area, the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly rejected application of the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine to contract matters. Pointing out that the
decisions adopting the doctrine (or its sister concept the product line doctrine)
had emphasized that they were necessary to do justice in product liability
matters. The Ohio court concluded:
However valid the justifications for expanding the liability of
successor corporations in products liability cases, those justifications
do not apply here. Unlike tort law, which is guided largely by
public policy consideration, contract law looks primarily to the
intentions of the parties. . . . To expand the mere-continuation
exception to a contractual claim would virtually negate the difference
between an asset purchase and a stock purchase ... [and] unneces-
sarily chill the marketplace of corporate acquisitions.8 6
There is only the most limited authority to the contrary. In an alternative
holding, a bankruptcy court imposed contract liability under the continuity
of the enterprise doctrine on a successor corporation. 7 In affirming on
other grounds, the district court expressly stated that it was not ruling on the
continuity of the enterprise holding. 8 This limited reference appears to be
85. E.g., City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir.
1990) (Virginia law); Duffs v. Erato Shipping, Inc., 684 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1982), affd on
other grounds sub nom. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duffs, 461 U.S. 529 (1983); Mesiti
v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H. 1990); Goffe, 605 F. Supp. at 1154.
86. Welco Indus., 617 N.E.2d at 1133 (citation omitted). Two dissenting judges would
have applied the continuity of the enterprise doctrines to issues of corporate, contract, and tax
law without requiring dissolution of the predecessor corporation. Id. at 1135-36.
87. Peterson v. Neumann, 177 B.R. 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
88. Id. at 591.
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the only decision supporting the conclusion that successorship under these
innovative theories extends to contract matters.
By contractual provision, the predecessor and successor may agree that
between themselves, the successor shall not be liable for the predecessor's
debts. Imposition of liability for contract debts upon the successor through
application of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, at best, gives rise to
a third-party beneficiary action by the successor against the predecessor. In
some jurisdictions such a remedy is simply unavailable. Even where it may
be available, however, the imposition of successor liability in contract matters
would move the risk of collectability against the predecessor from the
creditor, who bargained to accept it, to the successor, who bargained to shield
itself from such risks. What is the justification?
There appear to be none, except where the bona fide nature of the
transaction between the predecessor and the successor is suspect. In a
contract matter, this would seem to be governed by the fraudulent transfer
laws. Except in cases where the predecessor-transferor has not received
reasonably equivalent consideration and is insolvent or has a reasonably small
capital after the transaction, the creditor has no complaint. In brief, an
extension of the doctrine to contract matters is difficult to sustain.
The special liability concepts developed in product liability matters have
not been applied in other tort matters. Only one decision has apparently
considered the matter. In a recent decision, Grand Laboratories, Inc. v.
Midcon Labs, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit flatly asserted that
the continuation of the enterprise doctrine had no application outside of
product liability matters.8 9 It rejected the doctrine's application in a case
involving the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets.9 ° Another court of
appeals also made the same general assertion in refusing to apply Michigan
continuity law for CERCLA successorship purposes.9
Although traditional doctrines of successorship liability have been widely
applied throughout the law, including common law areas such as contract and
tort matters generally, modern expansive doctrines, such as the product line
and continuity of the enterprise doctrines, have not been accepted in common
law controversies aside from product liability matters. Statutory law is
somewhat different. The continuity of the enterprise doctrine has won wide
recognition in the implementation of a significant number of federal
regulatory programs.
89. Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283 (citing Antle, 758 F.2d at 1458 n.1).
90. Id.
91. City Management, 43 F.3d at 244.
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VII. THE CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE IN
STATUTORY LAW GENERALLY
As noted, traditional successorship doctrines apply throughout statutory
law as well as common law. Relying on the traditional successorship, courts
have imposed statutory liability on successor corporations in statutory areas
as diverse as antitrust law,92 RICO, 93 and federal customs laws.94
The continuity of the enterprise and the product line doctrines are
concepts created to deal with the special problems presented by product
liability matters. Thus far, these doctrines have played no role at all in
statutory matters other than those dealing with environmental problems.
However, in the application of labor relations, employment, and
antidiscrimination statutes, administrative agencies and the courts have
developed the "integrated enterprise" doctrine, which dramatically expands
the scope of these regulatory programs. This doctrine, remarkably similar to
the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, also has been applied in successor-
ship matters, thereby fully realizing the successorship objectives of the latter
doctrine.
VIII. THE CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Introduction
CERCLA, as amended and supplemented,95 enacts an extensive
regulatory program controlling all aspects of hazardous waste generation,
transportation, and disposal. It also establishes a Superfund to finance
environmental improvements at hazardous waste sites.96 Environmental law,
particularly the cleanup provisions of CERCLA, has been widely litigated
and has become the subject of extensive commentary. Much of the litigation
has involved whether and under what circumstances such statutory terms as
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994); see, e.g., Continental Grain Co. v. Pullman Standard, Inc.,
690 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ghouth v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325,
1328 (N.D. I11. 1986).
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); see, e.g., United States v. Shields Rubber Corp., 732 F.
Supp. 569 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
95. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)); The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994)).
96. Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. V 1987)). See
generally Developments in the Law- Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458 (1986).
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"operator" or "owner" may be construed as the basis for the imposition of
liability on one affiliated corporation of a corporate group for the statutory
obligations of another.97 Another highly disputed area of more particular
relevance is the issue of successor liability.98
Courts considering these and other CERCLA issues generally have agreed
on the need for an "expansive construction of remedial environmental
statutes." 99 They have warned that "[t]he statute should not be narrowly
interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly and
effectively, or to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs
beyond the limits expressly provided."'" Thus, there is general agreement
on the need for the "broad" and "liberal" interpretation of the statute.' 0 '
This philosophical outlook has encouraged the courts to accept an expansive
view toward the role of successorship in the implementation of the
underlying objectives of environmental laws.
B. Choice of Law
Notwithstanding the draconian features of the CERCLA program, the
courts have widely agreed that the statute contemplates successor liability.
Application of successorship liability with reliance on traditional successor-
ship doctrines is widespread. 2 In addition, numerous cases have upheld
97. See generally BLUMBERG, GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 40, at ch. 18.
98. Successor liability under CERCLA has attracted an enormous commentary. See, e.g.,
Green, supra note 30, at 897; Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise"
Theories of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11 Miss. C. L. REV. 63 (1990);
Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate
Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259 (1992); Daniel H. Squire et al., Corporate Successor
Liability Under CERCLA: Who's Next?, 43 Sw. L.J. 887 (1990); L. De-Wayne Layfield,
Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law: Responding to an
Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1237 (1990); see also BLUMBERG, GENERAL
STATUTORY LAW, supra note 40, § 18.02 n.63 (Supp. 1997).
99, United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs., Inc., 763 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Miller v. United States, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985).
100. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
101. See, e.g., Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 249 (2d Cir. 1996); Carolina
Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837-38 (stating that "since CERCLA is a remedial statute, its
provisions should be construed broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purpose"); Anspec
Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991); Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986); State v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1945).
102. E.g., Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1246; Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d
1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,
91-92 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) (statutory merger); In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1989) (de facto
merger); American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., No. 89C0168, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10999, at *18 (Aug. 20, 1990) (de facto merger), rev'd 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11417,
at *1 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 29, 1990) (summary judgement improper).
19961
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
CERCLA successorship liability under the more controversial continuity of
the enterprise doctrine.'0 3
Choice of law to determine successor liability becomes the threshold
issue, an issue that is often crucial in determining the outcome of the
litigation. Although there is still some vigorous disagreement, the courts
generally agree that federal common law, not state law, governs CERCLA
successorship issues. These courts have agreed that the need for "broad"
implementation of the statute, emphasized in CERCLA decisions, requires the
development of a uniform, federal common law to control the application of
statutory liability in cases of successorship.' ° Thus, one court has termed
CERCLA a "national solution to a nationwide problem ... [requiring] a
uniform federal rule for liability."'0 5 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit disagrees and continues to hold that state law, not federal law,
governs successorship issues."°  Some isolated courts have followed
suit.107
The emphasis on federal law almost inevitably means that the underlying
objectives and policies of CERCLA will play a central role in decisions on
successorship as well as on underlying liability issues, thereby creating
significant pressure for an expansive construction of the outer bounds of
statutory liability. As one court stated:
In CERCLA, courts have fashioned their own doctrines to impose
liability on successor corporations in order to overcome the statute's
shortcomings in addressing such issue. These doctrines were created
in order to prevent corporations from evading liability through
103. See cases cited infra notes 115-17, 120-23.
104. See, e.g., Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 1994); Mexico
Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 488; Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 909 F.2d at 1260; Smith Land, 851
F.2d at 91-92; Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Total Waste Management Corp.,
867 F. Supp. 1136, 1140-41 (D.N.H. 1994) (adopting a broader interpretation of exceptions);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp 1261, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1994; Carolina
Transformer, 739 F. Supp. at 1038-39; In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31; United States
v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. II. 1984); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
The application of federal law does not extend to indemnification liability for statutory
obligations arising under a contract between the parties. As with other contract matters, state
contract law governs, at least so long as liability to the federal government by either party is
not affected. See Beazer East, 34 F.3d at 215; John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d
401, 406 (1st Cir. 1993); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1454-55 (9th
Cir. 1986).
105. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31.
106. E.g., City Management, 43 F.3d at 250 (applying Michigan law); Anspec, 922 F.2d
at 1248.
107. E.g., Blackstone Valley Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 73 (D.
Mass. 1994); HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993);
New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., 174 B.R. 366 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1994).
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changes of ownership when there is a buy-out, a merger or asset
purchase.'
In an early statement of policy, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) made its position clear, calling for the imposition of successor liability
on purchasers who conduct substantially the same business operations as the
seller, without regard to the doctrinal requirements applicable in other legal
areas."° In this favorable context for decision, courts applying federal
common law concepts have most often gone on to accept the continuity of
the enterprise doctrine and have substantially widened the scope of CERCLA
successorship liability.
Choice of state law leads to a very different result, depending on whether
traditional doctrines or the continuity of the enterprise doctrine is involved.
The state courts generally have accepted the traditional successorship
doctrines. Application of state law to CERCLA matters, accordingly, does
not present a major issue so long as the requirements of traditional
successorship doctrines can be satisfied."0 However, where traditional
doctrines are inapplicable, and CERCLA successorship liability rests, if at all,
on the application of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, choice of law
may be crucial. Continuity of the enterprise is a minority doctrine in state
law, even in product liability matters. Thus, in most cases, choice of state
law automatically prevents the application of the continuity doctrine as a
basis for imposition of liability in contrast to choice of federal common law,
which widely recognizes the innovative doctrine.'"
There is a further hurdle for courts that look to state law. Even if the
state in question is one of the few applying the continuity of the enterprise
doctrine for product liability purposes so that the state law barriers to
application of the doctrine do not arise, an obstacle remains. The court must
go further and decide whether under such state law, the continuity doctrine
is confined to product liability matters, or whether it also has broader
application to matters such as CERCLA. If the court concludes that even
where accepted, the continuity doctrine is restricted to product liability
matters, choice of state law effectively bars the imposition of CERCLA
108. United States v. Peirce, No. 83-CV-1623, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4042, at *3 (N.D.
N.Y. Feb. 18, 1995) (citations omitted).
109. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91 n.2 (citing COURTNEY M. PRICE, EPA, MEMO:
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS AND SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (June 13,
1984)).
110. See Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1245 (finding that "universally accepted principle[s] of
private corporate" successorship law are applicable to CERCLA).
I ll. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. CIV.A.92-5394, WL
117671, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law to extend liability
although only incomplete continuity of shareholders).
1996]
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
successor liability. The decision in City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical
Co. illustrates the nigh-impenetrable barriers of state law. In City Manage-
ment, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying the law of
Michigan, which is one of the leading jurisdictions applying the continuity
of the enterprise doctrine, held that its use in Michigan was limited to
product liability matters and, accordingly, that it was unavailable for
CERCLA purposes."12
C. Successorship Liability
In business transfers involving asset purchases in which an unrelated
purchaser neither has continuity of ownership with the seller nor expressly
assumes CERCLA liabilities, successor liability for CERCLA purposes must
rest, if available at all, on the continuity of the enterprise doctrine." 3
Numerous cases have attempted to deal with this issue. As mentioned, with
the EPA early advocating enterprise liability, this issue is highly controversial
and vigorously litigated. The courts are divided, and the ultimate outcome
is not entirely clear.
Unlike the antidiscrimination and employment statutes, in which the
courts have uniformly adopted the enterprise principles applied in the labor
relations area through the "integrated enterprise" doctrine, there is no long-
established jurisprudence in a related statute that provides guidance for the
courts in environmental matters. As courts have recognized, labor law
doctrines are irrelevant in the application of successor liability for environ-
mental or other nonlabor purposes. The statutory objectives are very
different, and the labor law doctrines give central place to factors such as
centralized control of labor relation matters, which are wholly irrelevant for
environmental and other nonlabor statutory concerns." 4
Where courts have applied federal common law, they have generally
gone on to recognize the continuity of the enterprise doctrine and to invoke
it in support of the imposition of statutory liability on purchasers of
businesses with contaminated sites. The Courts of Appeal for the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits have approved the doctrine. " 5  Numerous district
112. City Management, 43 F.3d. at 244. But cf. In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 908 F.
Supp. 400, 412 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (using continuity of the enterprise for antitrust matters).
113. The other nontraditional successorship doctrine, that is, the product line doctrine, has
ceased to attract additional converts. For a lone exception under New Jersey law, see Depart-
ment of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980) (N.J.
Spill Act) (alternate holding).
114. See Light, supra note 98, at 80-83 (analyzing precedents under federal labor law).
115. Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487; Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837.
Although in Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 86, the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit
approved the application of successorship as a basis for CERCLA liability, it has yet to act
on the continuity of the enterprise theory. See Steams & Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin
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courts" 6 and isolated state courts 117 have done so as well.
In the process, the continuity of the enterprise doctrine has taken on
somewhat different dimensions for purposes of environmental law than its
formulation in product liability law, from where the doctrine emerged and
from which it has been borrowed. In the environmental area, "the continuity
of the enterprise is a more eclectic doctrine" resting on "the totality of the
circumstances," whereas in product liability law, it has well-defined doctrinal
requirements.
For example, when the Michigan Supreme Court first formulated the
continuity doctrine for product liability purposes, it carefully identified four
factors required for the imposition of liability. In addition to continuity of
the business, they included the liquidation and dissolution of the seller; the
purchaser's assumption of the "obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary
for [conduct] ... of the normal business operations"; and the purchaser
holding itself out as the "effective continuation of the seller.""' 8 Although
some subsequent courts have viewed these as guidelines and have applied a
totality standard in product liability cases, not all have done so.
The totality of the circumstances standard as employed in the CERCLA
decisions is quite different. In imposing CERCLA successor liability under
the continuity of the enterprise doctrine in Carolina Transformer, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit identified the various factors to be
considered." 9 These included: the same employees, supervisory personnel,
production facilities in the same location, product, and trade name; continuity
of assets; continuity of general business operations; and the successor holding
itself out as the continuation of the previous enterprise. 20
In Mexico Feed & Seed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
similarly upheld the continuity of the enterprise standard for CERCLA
successorship purposes. While accepting the factors enumerated in Carolina
Transformer, the Mexico Feed & Seed decision included additional factors:
whether the case involved any effort to continue the business while avoiding
Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 810 (D.N.J. 1996).
116. E.g., Peirce, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4042, at *4-5 (supporting the theory but not yet
acting upon it); Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 876 F. Supp. 934
(W.D. Mich. 1994) (stated by the court in City Management, 43 F.3d at 252 n.12, to have
been decided erroneously); Kleen, 867 F. Supp. at 1136; Hunt's Generator Comm. v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1994); United States v. Distler, 741 F.
Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (CERCLA) (stated by the court in City Management, 43 F.3d at
252 n. 12 to have been decided erroneously); N. Storonske Cooperage, 174 B.R. at 366.
117. E.g., PSC Resources, 175 N.J. Super. at 447, 419 A.2d at 1151 (applying the product
line and the continuity of the enterprise doctrines).
118. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
119. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838.
120. Id.; see Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985).
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existing or potential environmental liability; whether the purchaser had any
knowledge of CERCLA liabilities; and whether there were substantial ties
between the purchasing and selling corporations.'
The factors specified in Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed & Seed
are much more comprehensive and detailed than the factors specified for
product liability purposes by Turner. Moreover, unlike in Turner, not all
must be established for CERCLA successorship liability. 2 For Carolina
Transformer and Mexico Feed & Seed, as well as for most of the lower
courts, the totality standard prevails. The readiness of the courts to apply a
totality standard for CERCLA purposes stands in contrast to their application
of some of the traditional doctrines in other areas of the law where all
elements of those doctrines must be established in most jurisdictions.123
Although it superficially appears that an impressive weight of authority
supports application of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine for CERCLA
matters, this may be an illusion. The supporting authority is, in fact, weaker
than it appears. Some of the courts applying the concept have relied, at least
in part, on other features such as a linkage between the successor and
predecessor companies, 24 which suggests that traditional mere continuation
might have been applied instead. Other courts adopting the continuity
doctrine have conditioned it upon the successor's knowledge of potential
CERCLA liability.125  Still other statements are no more than dictum with
the courts expressing support for application of the doctrine, but for
decisional purposes, finding the doctrine inapplicable on the facts of the
case. 126
A minority of the courts have rejected the use of the continuity of the
enterprise doctrine for CERCLA purposes. These include the Courts of
121. 980 F.2d at 489-90.
122. E.g., Peirce, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4042, at *8-9; Atlantic Richfield, 847 F. Supp.
at 1287.
123. Cf. In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1015 ("No one of these factors is either
necessary or sufficient."); and N. Storonske Cooperage, 174 B.R. at 382; with State of New
York v. Panex Indus., Inc., No. 94-CV-0400E(H), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9418, at *28
(W.D.N.Y. June 21, 1996) (stating that all factors are required).
124. E.g., Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 840-41; N. Storonske Cooperage, 174 B.R.
at 366.
125. Cf. United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that application conditional on successor "expressly or impliedly agree[ing] to
assume liability"), and United States v. Vermont Am. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 318, 318-19 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (declining to apply the continuation of the enterprise doctrine, notwithstanding
continuity of location, employees, customers, and suppliers where there is no hint of
knowledge of CERCLA liability or intent to evade it in the sale).
126. E.g., Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487; Elf Atochem N. Am. v. United States,
908 F. Supp. 275, 283-84 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Hunt's Generator Comm., 863 F. Supp. at 879;
Atlas Minerals & Chems., 824 F. Supp. at 49-51; Allied Corp., 812 F. Supp. at 129.
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Appeal for the Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan law,'27 and a number of
district courts. 2 ' Some courts applying state law have reached the same
conclusion. 129 After noting that the continuity of the enterprise doctrine is
a minority view in product liability matters, some of these court decisions,
such as the Sixth Circuit decision in City Management, have emphasized that
even where accepted, it is applicable only to product liability matters and
accordingly, inapplicable to CERCLA successorship matters. 3°
City Management arose in Michigan, a leading state in applying the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that successor liability under CERCLA was determined by state
corporation law, not federal common law, and accordingly held that Michigan
law, not federal common law, governed CERCLA successorship liability.
However, it went on to hold that the Michigan continuity doctrine was
restricted to product liability.' The court relied on the statements in
Turner, the Michigan decision that had introduced the doctrine, emphasizing
the product liability dimensions of the case 32 and the fact that other
Michigan decisions had thus far applied the doctrine only in product liability
cases. 33 Although couched in terms of Michigan law, the court left no
doubt of its view that the continuity of the enterprise doctrine was inapplica-
ble to CERCLA matters, even if federal common law had been applicable.
It also relied on decisions outside of Michigan to support its result. In so
doing, the court rejected the decision of its lower court and the decisions of
other lower courts in its circuit that had held the continuity of the enterprise
standard applicable to CERCLA successor liability, and it termed them
"erroneous."134
As illustrated by City Management, the choice of state law is generally
decisive. As noted, only a few states have adopted the continuity of the
enterprise doctrine for product liability purposes. Further, as City Manage-
ment demonstrates, even in these states accepting the doctrine for product
127. City Management, 43 F.3d at 244 (Michigan law).
128. E.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180, 185 (D. Conn. 1993); United
States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1359 (N.D. III. 1992); Sylvester
Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 772 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D. Minn. 1990) (continuity of
the enterprise appears to remain "the minority position") (citation omitted).
129. E.g., Anderson v. Minnetonka, No. CIV3-90-312, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4849, at *1
(D. Minn. Jan. 27, 1993) (Minnesota Environmental Act); State v. Gopher Oil Co., No. C2-95-
733, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1425, at *4 (Nov. 21, 1995) (unpublished).
130. City Management, 43 F.3d at 244. But cf In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 908 F. Supp.
at 412 (Alabama continuity doctrine applied to antitrust).
131. City Management, 43 F.3d at 244; see Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1247.
132. Turner, 244 N.W.2d 878-84.
133. See City Management, 43 F.3d at 252-53; Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877.
134. City Management, 43 F.3d at 252 n.12 (stating that Charter Township of Oshtemo,
876 F. Supp. 934, and Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 643, were decided erroneously).
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liability purposes, the state doctrine may be construed to apply to product
liability matters only. In either event, successor liability under CERCLA
becomes feasible in such jurisdictions only under the traditional successorship
doctrines.
D. Essential Elements for Application Under CERCLA
Notwithstanding the totality of the circumstances standard widely adopted
in the CERCLA cases, some courts have identified certain elements as
essential for application of the continuity doctrine. These include notice to
the successor of potential statutory liability and attempted avoidance of
liability; the absence of a remedy against the predecessor; the extent of the
transferred assets; and the use of the transferred assets in the continued
conduct of the predecessor's business.
Notice. The need for notice of potential CERCLA liability has been
characterized as an essential element by a number of courts.'35 One court
refused to apply the continuation of the enterprise doctrine, notwithstanding
continuity of location, employees, and customers, where there had been no
hint of knowledge of CERCLA liability or proof of any intent to avoid
it.' 36  Another court concluded that successor liability "is rarely found"
when a purchaser has no knowledge of potential CERCLA liability. 37
Other courts have not gone as far, concluding that although this factor is
relevant, it is not essential. 3
Absence of other remedy. A number of courts have emphasized that
imposition of successor liability under the continuity of the enterprise
doctrine is appropriate only where a remedy against the predecessor is not
available. 139 Others have expressly rejected this contention asserting that it
would gravely weaken the implementation of the CERCLA statutory
remedy. 4 °
Assets transferred and their use. Some CERCLA cases have contended
that the continuity doctrine is applicable only when substantially all the assets
of the predecessor have been transferred to the alleged successor. 4'
135. E.g., Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265-66; ELF, 908 F. Supp. at 279; Vermont Am.,
871 F. Supp. at 318; Anderson, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4846, at *23; Atlas Minerals &
Chems., 824 F. Supp. at 50; see Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d. at 489.
136. Vermont Am., 871 F. Supp. at 318-19.
137. See ELF, 908 F. Supp. at 277.
138. American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10999, at
*20 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 1990 Dist. LEXIS 11417 (N.D. II1. 1990) (summary judgment
improper).
139. E.g., Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 97; cf City Management, 43 F.3d at 244.
140. E.g., N. Storonske Cooperage, 174 B.R. at 384.
141. E.g., Howard v. Clifton Hydraulic Press Co., 830 F. Supp. 708, 710-11 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
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However, for common law purposes, some courts have been ready to look
at the business in terms of the various divisions through which it conducts
its business and have concluded that transfer of all the assets of a particular
division would suffice.'4 2 Other courts have refused to do so in cases
where the predecessor not only retained a significant part of its preexisting
assets, but also continued in operation rather than liquidating and dissolv-
ing. 4
3
The use to which assets are put after acquisition may constitute still
another limitation on the use of the continuity of the enterprise doctrine. One
court has refused to apply the doctrine where the assets acquired were not
employed by the acquiring company as an integrated whole for the continued
operation of the business formerly conducted by its predecessor."
Arm 's-length nature of the transaction. Where the sale of the business
is at fair value, determined in an arm's-length negotiation, courts find it more
difficult to impose successorship liability. However, where the transaction
is between related parties and the successor acquires the business at less than
fair value, the courts are more ready to impose liability.
45
IX. THE CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE IN LABOR
RELATIONS, ANTIDISCRIMINATION, AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Introduction
Under doctrines such as the integrated enterprise doctrine, used for
determining a "single employer," and the labor "alter ego" doctrine,
formulated by the NLRB and accepted by the courts, the regulation of labor
relations under the NLRA is governed by enterprise principles.'46 Although
142. See cases cited supra note 71.
143. See id.
144. See, e.g., Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 97.
145. See, e.g., Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 832. Where there is an arm's-length
transaction, courts are hostile to application of the doctrine. See Atlas Minerals & Chems.,
824 F. Supp. at 51 (finding there was arm's-length and bona fide transaction); Allied Corp.,
812 F. Supp. at 129 (finding that there was an arm's-length merger).
146. The triumph of enterprise principles in U.S. statutory law has occurred in federal labor
relations law where it prevails in unchallenged fashion for regulatory matters. However, in
paradoxical fashion, such reliance on enterprise principles has been confined to the scope of
the jurisdiction of the agency and to the determination of substantive regulatory matters within
the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB under the NLRA. These include such vital areas as the
determination of statutory jurisdiction, the collective bargaining unit, the scope of applicability
of the collective bargaining agreement, and unfair labor practices, including secondary
boycotts. For these purposes, the courts have fully accepted the integrated enterprise standard
introduced by the NLRB. However, for other matters, such as contract actions under the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994), that originate in the district courts and do not go through the
NLRB administrative process at all, these enterprise doctrines have been flatly rejected, and
traditional entity law applied. See, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 23-24
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the NLRB plays no role in the other federal employment statutes, courts
generally have applied the same enterprise principles that prevail under the
NLRA to the administration of other federal employment regulatory
programs. These include such matters as employment discrimination, wages
and hours, equal pay, occupational safety, and shutdown and closing
notice.'47 Except for labor contract litigation under the Taft-Hartley Act,
enterprise principles, generally prevail throughout U.S. federal labor and
employment law. This broad acceptance of enterprise principles also
includes successor liability.
48
In the labor and employment area, successorship rests on the continuity
of the enterprise, with successorship concepts expressed in terms of the
enterprise doctrines developed in this area, such as the integrated enterprise
doctrine and the special labor law alter ego doctrine. 49 Although formulat-
ed somewhat differently for labor regulatory purposes, the integrated
enterprise doctrine, closely resembles the continuity of the enterprise doctrine
as applied in product liability law and in statutory areas such as environmen-
tal law.
B. Labor Relations Law
Forty years ago, the NLRB formulated the "integrated enterprise"
standard for determining when separate concerns would be treated as a
"single employer" under the NLRA regulatory program for purposes such as
jurisdiction, determination of the bargaining unit, the existence of a duty to
bargain, and secondary boycotts. Application of the standard depends on
four factors: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor
relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial
control. While none of the factors is essential, it is plain that integrated
operations and centralized control of labor relations are the most important.
After its formulation by the NRLB, the doctrine was readily accepted by the
(1st Cir. 1983); Local Union No. 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs. v. Namco Elec., Inc., 653 F.2d
143, 147 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Whether two firms are a single employer for collective bargaining
purposes and whether a single contract is binding on two separate corporations are not only
different questions, but they may have different answers."); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr.
Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 386 (9th Cir. 1979); see also BLUMBERG, GENERAL STATUTORY LAW,
supra note 40, at § 13.13.
147. These federal statutes will be referred to collectively as the "labor and employment"
statutes.
148. See Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to the NLRB
integrated enterprise standard and stating that the "federal common law successorship doctrine
... now extends to almost every employment law statute"); see also BLUMBERG, GENERAL
STATUTORY LAW, supra note 40, §§ 13.02, 13.03, 13.08-.10, 13.13.
149. The labor law alter ego doctrine is very different from its counterpart in corporation
law. See BLUMBERO, GENERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 40, § 13.13.
[VIol. 10
CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE
Supreme Court, and it has governed labor law ever since.5 °
In its first stage of development when it resembled the mere continuation
doctrine, the integrated enterprise standard included successorship liability
where the companies were interrelated. Early on, the federal courts inquired
"[w]hether there was ... a true change of ownership ... or merely a
disguised continuance of the old employer."'' Liability was imposed
where there was "substantial identity of management, business purpose,
operation, equipment, customers, supervision and ownership."'' 2  Under
such circumstances, affiliated or related successor entities acquiring a
business or utilizing the labor force, equipment, or other elements of the
predecessor company became liable for the labor obligations of the
predecessor, including obligations under preexisting collective bargaining
agreements or obligations to bargain.5 3
The application of enterprise principles in labor successorship cases was
reinforced by the development of the closely related labor doctrine of alter
ego liability. While this doctrine substantially overlaps the integrated
enterprise standard, the courts apply it only where the successor has been
found to represent an attempt to evade the obligations of an affiliated
predecessor under the labor acts." Unlike the integrated enterprise
standard, it depends in significant part on the predecessor's own conduct and
motivation and therefore, does not present the same interesting dependence
on status and relational law as that presented by the integrated enterprise and
continuity of the enterprise doctrines.
The imposition of successorship liability in reliance on such enterprise
principles has not been confined to matters arising under the NLRA but also
has arisen in actions under section 301 of the LMRA to enforce a
predecessor's obligation to make pension fund contributions as contained in
a collective bargaining agreement. 5 5 Where there had been no change in
150. See 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14 (1956), accepted in Radio & Television Broadcast
Technicians Local Union v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per
curiam); see, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
151. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942); see NLRB v. Herman
Bros. Pet Supply, Inc. 325 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1963).
152. Cf. Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419 (2d Cir. 1984).
153. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BAsIC TEXT ON LAW LABOR: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ch. 24 (1976); David A. Anderson, Suits to Bind Nonsignatories to
Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section 301: The Emerging Federal Common Law,
1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 241; Walter V. Siebert & N. Dawn Webber, Joint Employer, Single
Employer, and Alter Ego, 3 LAB. LAW. 873, 877-80 (1987); Comment, Bargaining Obligations
After Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624 (1979).
154. E.g., Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106; Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v.
Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982); see BLUMBERG, GENERAL STATUTORY
LAW, supra note 40, § 13.13.
155. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994).
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ownership and the successor "controlled the same assets and conducted the
same businesses from the same facilities . . . [and where] [t]he same
employees were employed in the same jobs and under the same working
conditions," Robbins v. Newman held a successor-controlled corporation
liable for the pension fund obligations of its predecessor controlling
shareholder. 6 Without inquiry into such subjective factors as intent to
evade, the court imposed liability in reliance on successorship doctrines
derived from labor law generally. 7 A case under the Employee Retire-
ment Insurance Security Act (ERISA) has similarly imposed pension fund
contribution liability on a successor affiliate.5
With the emphatic recognition of successor liability for labor relations
law purposes in cases involving affiliated corporations or other continuity of
ownership, the enterprise principles of "single employer" and "integrated
enterprise" were soon extended to include transfers of businesses that did not
involve any continuity of proprietary interest." 9 This is its second stage
of development, closely resembling the continuity of the enterprise doctrine.
Thus, in a leading case, NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,'"
the Supreme Court upheld successor liability under the NLRA for collective
bargaining purposes where an unrelated successor acquired a business in the
market without continuity of ownership.
Successorship liability for unrelated successors, however, differs in one
important respect from liability for affiliated successors. Where there is no
continuity of ownership, the courts impose an obligation to bargain, but do
not bind the successor to the terms of the predecessor's labor agreement, as
is the case for an affiliated successor. 1
6 1
The integrated enterprise doctrine as applied for labor relations purposes,
including successor liability, has been uniformly extended to other areas of
federal labor and employment law. 62 Although the labor doctrines have
been used as analogies both in product liability 63 and CERCLA decisions,
156. Robbins v. Newman, 481 F. Supp. 1241, 1242 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
157. E.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
158. Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Thummel, 738 F.2d 926, 929-30 (8th
Cir. 1984); see ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
159. Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 106; Fugazy Continental, 725 F.2d at 1420; NLRB
v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 554 (3d Cir. 1983); Penntech Papers, 706 F.2d at 24;
Carpenters Local Union No. 1846, 690 F.2d at 489; NLRB v. Tricor Prods., Inc., 636 F.2d
266, 266 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1960);
Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. No. 174, at 1144 (1976).
160. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. at 277-78.
161. Id. at 272; see Anderson, supra note 153, at 248.
162. Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 843; Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1095; see Baker v. Delta Air Lines,
6 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 1993).
163. See Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 8 (1977).
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they are not very helpful because they relate so intimately to the particular
problems presented by the collective bargaining process and the federal labor
policies seeking to encourage and reinforce it."
C. Antidiscrimination Employment Law
Employment antidiscrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination Enforcement Act have followed
labor relations cases in determining successorship liability for a predecessor's
discriminatory acts when a company, affiliated or unaffiliated, acquires a
business or utilizes the labor force, equipment, or other elements of another
affiliate within the group or of an unrelated party. 65  Successor liability
under this theory also has been applied under the antidiscrimination statutes
against trade unions in their own role as employers."6
Successorship liability under the antidiscrimination statutes depends on
factors such as
1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge [of
discriminatory conduct], 2) the ability of the predecessor to provide
relief, 3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of business
operations, 4) whether the new employer uses the same plant, 5)
whether he uses the same or substantially the same work force, 6)
whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory
personnel, 7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially the
same working conditions, 8) whether he uses the same machinery,
equipment and methods of production and 9) whether he produces
the same product. 167
These factors comprise the totality of the circumstances standard in this area
of law.161
164. See Light, supra note 98, at 80-83.
165. E.g., Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1095; Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.
1985); Bates v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 744 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding cases applying
"successor doctrine to remedy unfair labor practices are applicable equally to remedy unfair
employment practices in violation of Title VII"); EEOC v. Local 638, 700 F. Supp. 739
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also cases cited infra notes 169-171.
166. E.g., Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920
F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1990) (Multiemployer Pension Plan Act); cf Oregon Laborers-Employers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. All State Indus. & Marine Cleaning, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 905
(D. Or. 1994).
167. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, 503 F.2d at 1094 (citations omitted).
168. See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975); MacMillan Bloedel
Containers, 503 F.2d at 1094; cf Rabidue v. Osceola Beef Co., 805 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir.
1986); Wiggins v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978).
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Where such factors are present, the courts have upheld application of the
continuity doctrine and imposition of successor statutory liability even where
the successor was an unrelated concern without continuity of ownership.' 69
Courts have agreed that a successor employer may be bound by a consent
decree in an employment antidiscrimination action against its predecessor
where the successor used the same plant, work force, supervisory personnel,
and machinery, notwithstanding the absence of any continuity of owner-
ship. 170
D. Miscellaneous Employment Statutes
The successorship concepts adopted for purposes of the labor relations
laws have been widely applied to areas of federal labor employment law
other than labor relations and antidiscrimination. These areas include the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), governing wages and hours, 17 1
the Equal Pay Act, 172 ERISA, 173 and the Mine Safety & Health Act.174
Notwithstanding the variations in statutory objectives, no discernable
difference in application of the underlying doctrine is apparent as one moves
from one labor employment statute to another, except in two respects.
Application in the antidiscrimination area appears restricted to cases where
the successor has some notice of the liability and where no remedy is
available against the predecessor. Cases under the other statutes also have
been concerned with these elements.
171
E. Restrictions on Imposition of Successorship
Liability Under the Labor Laws
In the labor area, the courts have vigorously applied concepts of
successorship liability in implementation of the "national policies underlying
169. E.g., Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1095; see Baker, 6 F.3d at 636-39.
170. See Bates, 744 F.2d at 709-10; Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 67 F.3d 129, 133
(6th Cir. 1995) (except where precluded by contractual terms of the consent decree).
171. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994); e.g., Brock v. Executive Towers, Inc., 796 F.2d
698, 700-01 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); United States v. Stanley, 416 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir.
1969); Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 365 F.2d 641, 643-45 (10th Cir. 1966).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); e.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 617.
173. E.g., Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension Fund, 920 F.2d at 1325-26 (Multiemployer
Pension Plan Act); Trustees for Alaska v. Laborers-Construction Indus. Health & Sec. Fund
v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1987); Oregon Laborers-Employers Health &
Welfare Trust Fund, 850 F. Supp. at 909; Local 638, 700 F. Supp. at 739 (union merger); see
Cruz v. Central States Jt. Bd. Health & Welfare Trust Fund, No. 93-C-0151, 1993 WL
259444, at *1, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,961 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1993).
174. Secretary of Labor v. Mullins, 888 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
175. Compare environmental law decisions cited supra notes 136-41.
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the statute at issue."' 76 However, in viewing the doctrine as one arising in
equity, courts have made an effort to balance this important factor with a
recognition that" 'fairness is a prime consideration' "in the application of the
doctrine.' Thus, however widely applied in the labor context, the outer
boundary of successorship liability is not without restrictions. Some courts
imposing successor liability for violations of labor or employment statutes on
an unrelated successor have introduced significant limitations on application
of the doctrine. In Criswell v. Delta Air Lines, 78 for example, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that successorship liability under the
antidiscrimination laws depended on the existence of two elements in
addition to the orthodox aspects of the typical continued enterprise reviewed
above: notice on the part of the successor of the predecessor's obliga-
tions; 79 and the inability of the plaintiff to obtain relief directly from the
predecessor. "o
Lack of availability of remedy against the predecessor Like the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Criswell, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc. that "it would be grossly unfair, except
in the most exceptional circumstances, to impose successor liability on an
innocent purchaser when the predecessor is fully capable of providing
relief."18'
Notice to successor of existence of claim. As in Criswell, other courts
have held that successorship liability is inapplicable where no charges of
discrimination were pending on acquisition, and the acquiring company was
unaware of outstanding grievances.'82 All courts, however, do not agree.
At least one court has concluded that although notice is a factor to be consid-
ered, it is not essential.8 3 These decisions indicate that successorship
liability in antidiscrimination matters that involve unrelated corporations has
assumed a significantly more restrictive form than it has in environmental
matters, and it may be emerging as more restrictive in other labor areas.
176. Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 846; cf. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Jt. Exec. Bd.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974). The Court
stated that the question of successorship liability needed to be balanced with the interests of
the parties. Id. at 262-63 n.9.
177. Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 846 (quoting Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1094).
178. Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1094.
179. Id.; see also Steinbach,.51 F.3d at 843.
180. Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1094; see also Steinbach, 51 F.3d at 843; Musikiwamba, 760
F.2d at 750; Bates, 744 F.2d at 709-10.
181. Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750; see Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1094; Lumbard v. Maglia,
Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
182. E.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 616; Bates, 744 F.2d at 709-10 (Title VII); Wiggins, 583
F.2d at 886.
183. EEOC v. Local 638, No. CIV. 2877, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1862, at *23, 46 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,846 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
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Whether other courts will adopt such a restrictive policy for labor purposes
remains to be seen.
X. THE CONTINUITY OF THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE IN
OTHER STATUTORY LAW
Traditional successorship doctrines have been routinely applied to impose
liability under statutes other than those in the labor employment and
environmental areas. However, the imposition of successor liability under the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine in these other statutory areas has been
relatively infrequent. Examples may be found, however, in federal statutory
areas such as the antitrust acts, RICO, and the tax laws, as well as under
related state statutes.
Notwithstanding the lack of any continuity of ownership, a federal district
court, applying Alabama law, imposed successor liability for the
predecessor's pre-acquisition violations of the Clayton Act, resting on the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine." It did so even though "there is no
evidence" in the purchase contract that the successor "expressly agreed" to
assume the liability of the predecessor that the plaintiffs sought."5 Instead
of regarding the issue as one of successorship for purposes of enforcement
of a federal statute, the court regarded the issue as one of contract law and
turned to state law, in this case Alabama law.186 Like Michigan, Alabama
is one of a minority of jurisdictions applying the continuity of the enterprise
doctrine in product liability cases. After reviewing Alabama decisions that
had applied the continuity of the enterprise doctrine in product liability
matters, including decisions with an absence of continuity of ownership, the
court held that the Alabama continuity of the enterprise law also applied to
antitrust litigation.'87 Accordingly, the court upheld the complaint against
the successor under the Sherman Act.'
Successor liability has been held applicable in the enforcement of
RICO. I8 9 However, one court has observed that "successor liability should
be found only sparingly and in extreme cases due to the requirement that
RICO liability only attaches to knowing affirmatively willing partici-
pants.' 90
The concept of successorship based on relational principles plays an
184. In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 908 F. Supp. at 412.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 411-13.
187. Id. at 413.
188. Id. at 404-05.
189. Continental Grain, 690 F. Supp at 628; see Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 777 F. Supp.
1043, 1063 (D. Puerto Rico 1991).
190. Rodriguez, 777 F. Supp. at 1064 (citation omitted).
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important role in tax law where it provides essential flexibility in the
implementation of the objectives of the revenue statutes, as well as
preventing evasion through corporate manipulation. Successorship doctrines
are particularly prominent in areas of tax law such as tax loss carryovers. In
Libson Shops v. Koehler, the Supreme Court rejected a formalistic approach
and upheld the use by a successor corporation of the tax loss carryovers of
its sixteen predecessors.' 9' In the absence of statutory provision, the Court
said that offset was possible "only to the extent that this [offsetting] income
is derived from the operation of substantially the same business."'92
Numerous states faced with the same problem have similarly recognized
successorship in their own construction of comparable provisions in their tax
laws. In these cases, the successors were surviving corporations that
preserved the same corporate identity after statutory merger; there was
continuity of ownership as well.' 93
Section 6901 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the assessment
and collection of income tax liabilities from transferees of delinquent
taxpayers."9 The Regulations define transferees to include "the successor
of a corporation."' 95 However, application of these provisions has been
limited to cases involving transfers for less than a fair consideration, which
failed to leave equivalent value available for payment of the tax liability.
96
In any event, the IRS must exhaust its remedies against the taxpayer before
it may pursue the transferee, except where the taxpayer is insolvent or
otherwise unable to satisfy the liability. 97 Although section 6901 has been
held applicable to the surviving corporation after a statutory merger or
consolidation, 98 it does not appear to have been applied to other types of
successorship, traditional or innovational.
Maine is one state that has expanded traditional concepts of successor
liability in statutory construction. A Maine statute in the employment area
provides for successorship liability relying on concepts of enterprise liability.
191. 353 U.S. 382, 386, reh'g denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957).
192. Id. at 386. The Congress subsequently adopted §§ 381 and 382 of the Internal
Revenue Code, expressly authorizing such offsets in statutory mergers. I.R.C. §§ 381, 382
(1996).
193. E.g., Grade A Market, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Servs., 688 A.2d 1364, 1369
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (statutory merger); Good Will Distribs. (N.), Inc., v. Currie, 251 N.C.
120, 110 S.E.2d 880 (1959) (statutory merger).
194. I.R.C. § 6901(a)(1)(A)(i).
195. Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(b) (1996).
196. E.g., Reid Ice Cream Corp. v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1932).
197. E.g., Wire Wheel Corp. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 737, af'd 46 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.
1931).
198. E.g., A.D. Saenger, 38 B.T.A. 1295 (1932); see Oswego Falls Corp., 26 B.T.A. 60,
aftd, 71 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1934) (enforcing direct liability while deferring transferee liability
for proof of uncollectability from primary taxpayer).
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The Maine Employment Security Law, dealing with unemployment
insurance, expressly provides for successorship statutory liability on the
acquisition of an "organization, trade or business" without reference to any
continuity of ownership.'" The Maine Supreme Court held that the
successorship provision applied when the business had been acquired "in
toto" even though goodwill had not been transferred and the business had
been integrated into the successor's business, not conducted separately.
2°°
The Maine Supreme Court also has applied a continuity of the enterprise
standard in implementation of the unemployment provisions even though the
alleged successor did not acquire the business directly from the predeces-
sor.
201
XI. SUCCESSORSHIP AS SUPPORTING AMENABILITY TO JURISDICTION
A. Successorship and Jurisdiction
Numerous federal courts, imposing successor liability under the
traditional doctrines, have stated that successorship status also may serve as
a basis for jurisdictional purposes and satisfy constitutional standards.20 2
These situations have typically arisen in cases involving diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction with only an isolated decision involving a federal
question.2 3 State courts similarly have relied on successorship in finding
199. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1043(9)(B), 1228 (West 1996).
200. Cornwall Indus. v. Maine Dep't of Manpower Affairs, 351 A.2d 546, 550 (Me. 1976).
201. Janet M. Sing, Inc. v. Maine Dep't of Labor, 492 A.2d 892, 895 (Me. 1985).
202. E.g., Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623 (11 th Cir. 1996) (Florida
law); City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 454 (4th Cir.
1990); Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Independent Agent Center, Inc., 775 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1985); Duris v. Erato Shipping, Inc., 684 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529 (1983); McClary v. Erie Engine &
Mfg. Co., 856 F. Supp. 52 (D.N.H. 1994); Selection Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc., 852
F. Supp. 740, 765 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H. 1990)
(assumption); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Shaffer Stores Co., 240 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1965)
(merger); see Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir.
1991) (Oklahoma law); Saco River Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Shooshan & Jackson, Inc., 826 F. Supp.
580 (D. Me. 1993); Neagos v. Valmet-Appleton, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Inter-Americas Ins. Corp. v. Xycor Sys., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Kan. 1991); Bowers v.
Neti Technologies, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake
Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Va. 1987); Explosives Corp. v. Garlam Enterprises Corp.,
615 F. Supp. 364 (D.P.R. 1985); Goffe v. Blake, 605 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (D. Del. 1985);
Cole v. Caterpillar Mach. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. La. 1983).
Only one court appears to have disagreed and rejected successorship as the basis for
asserting jurisdiction. Johnston v. Pneumo Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (S.D. Miss. 1987)
(alternate holding). See generally I ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
§ 4.03(5)(d) (2d ed. 1991).
203. See Mesiti, 739 F. Supp. at 57 for an exception resting on federal question jurisdiction.
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a defendant amenable to their jurisdiction.2"
Relying on traditional successorship doctrines, these courts have upheld
the propriety of asserting in personam jurisdiction over a successor without
other contacts with the jurisdiction in reliance on the contacts of the
predecessor to the jurisdiction. They have done so in cases involving product
liability,205 tort (other than product liability),2°6 contracts °207 federal en-
vironmental law,208 and state statutory law.2° They also have done so
in successorship cases resting on assumption of liabilities210 or statutory
merger.21' They have indicated a readiness to do so in successorship cases
involving the de facto merger21 2 and the mere continuation theory,
213
although thus far no case appears to have so held. The doctrine has not yet
been applied in cases involving either the continuity of the enterprise or
product line doctrines. While much of the authority is only dicta, a
significant number of the cases dealing with successorship arising from
assumption of liabilities or statutory merger have, in fact, held that
successorship will support jurisdiction. 4
Whatever the nature of successorship doctrine, many courts seem to have
204. E.g., Bruns v. DeSoto Operating Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 876, 251 Cal. Rptr. 462
(1988); BCE Dev. Properties, Inc. v. Aero Exch., 538 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
Jeffrey v. Rapid Am. Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644 (Mich, 1995); Armour Handcrafts, Inc. v. Miami
Decorating & Design Center, Inc., 99 A.D.2d 521, 471 N.Y.S.2d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
205. E.g., Williams, 927 F.2d at 1128 (Oklahoma law); Neagos, 791 F. Supp. at 682;
Crawford Harbor Assocs., 661 F. Supp. at 880 (Virginia law); Cole, 562 F. Supp. at 179;
Bruns, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 876; BCE Dev. Properties, 538 So. 2d at 529; Armour Handcrafts,
99 A.D.2d at 521.
206. E.g., City of Richmond, 918 F.2d at 438 (Virginia law); Duris, 684 F.2d at 352;
Mesiti, 739 F. Supp. at 57; Goffe, 605 F. Supp. at 1154.
207. E.g., Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp. at 1213; Goffe, 605 F. Supp. at 1154; see
Explosives Corp., 615 F. Supp. at 364; Maryland Nat ' Bank, 240 F. Supp. at 777; Armour
Handcrafts, 99 A.D.2d at 521.
208. E.g., Mesiti, 739 F. Supp. at 57.
209. E.g., Bowers, 690 F. Supp. at 349 (Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Act).
210. E.g., City of Richmond, 918 F.2d at 438 (Virginia law); Explosives Corp., 615 F.
Supp. at 364; Bruns, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 876; see also Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp. at
1213; Bowers, 690 F. Supp. at 349 (successorship available under traditional doctrines
generally).
211. E.g., Duris, 684 F.2d at 352; Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp. at 1213; Bowers, 690
F. Supp. at 349 (successorship available under traditional doctrines generally); Goffe, 605 F.
Supp. at 1154; Cole, 562 F. Supp. at 179; Maryland Nat'l Bank, 240 F. Supp. at 777; Armour
Handcrafts, 99 A.D.2d at 521.
212. See Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp. at 1213; Bowers, 690 F. Supp. at 349
(successorship available under traditional doctrines generally).
213. E.g., Explosives Corp., 615 F. Supp. at 364; see also Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp.
at 1213; Bowers, 690 F. Supp. at 349 (ready to find jurisdiction by attribution of successorship
under any of the traditional doctrines).
214. E.g., City of Richmond, 918 F.2d at 451 (Virginia law) (statutory merger); Mesiti 739
F. Supp. at 57; Maryland Nat'l Bank, 240 F. Supp. 57; Bruns, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 876
(assumption); Armour Handcrafts, 99 A.D. 2d at 521 (statutory merger).
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assumed that if "any theory" of successorship is recognized, it will provide
the basis for jurisdiction over the successor.2 5 As one court observed: "the
practical feature of any theory of corporate successor liability... is that the
consequences of the predecessor's acts are visited upon the successor. If the
successor is to stand thus in the place of the predecessor, it must do so for
all purposes, including personal jurisdiction. ,216 This approach is unfortu-
nate; it assumes the answer. When the concepts shaping the substantive law
are seized upon unquestioningly to provide jurisdiction as well, the question
that remains unanswered is whether such attribution is constitutional. This
is unacceptable.
B. Constitutionality of the Assertion of Jurisdiction
Resting on Attribution Based on Successorship
Many courts have recognized that while attribution of contacts from
predecessor to successor may bring the successor within the pertinent long-
arm statute that provides the basis for specific jurisdiction, the issue of
constitutionality remains. However, with a rare exception, these courts have
confined consideration of constitutional issues to the relationship of the
predecessor to the forum. They have not addressed the more difficult
question of the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction over the
successor based entirely on its successorship status arising from its relation
to the predecessor.
Only in Inter-Americas Insurance Corp. v. Xycor Systems, 217 has a
court seriously examined whether successorship determined to be applicable
for substantive purposes also would satisfy constitutional standards. Inter-
Americas Insurance Corp. involved a complex series of corporate transac-
tions and restructuring, with the defendant's successorship status resting on
its assumption of the liability of its predecessor, an intermediate transferee
that in turn had assumed the liabilities of the party originally responsible.1 8
Under such circumstances, a district court held that the secondary assumption
did not satisfy the "minimum contacts" standard. 219 The court concluded
that it was "too attenuated" to lead the defendant reasonably to expect being
subject to the jurisdiction of the forum.220
Despite their near unanimous acceptance of the principle, thus far, almost
all of the courts have failed seriously to consider, whether attribution of the
215. See Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp. at 1213 ("substantial connection" with forum
lacking on the facts) for an exception.
216. See Crawford Harbor Assocs., 661 F. Supp. at 883 (product liability and contract).
217. Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F. Supp. at 1213.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1220.
220. Id.
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predecessor's contacts to the successor for jurisdictional, as well as
substantive, purposes satisfies constitutional standards and whether the
successorship theory relied on makes any difference. Such a consideration is
overdue. Although various successorship theories lead to the substantive
outcome, they rest on widely different jurisprudential foundations. These
fundamental differences in their origin create different problems in determin-
ing the constitutionality of the attribution of jurisdiction based on successor-
ship status. Each theory must, accordingly, be analyzed separately.
Merger. Under the traditional theories of successorship resting on
statutory merger or de facto merger, successor liability arises because the
predecessor's juridical identity, with all its rights and duties, has been
incorporated into the juridical identity of the surviving corporation. This is
the result of corporate fusion and serves for all legal purposes.221 It is very
different from other forms of successorship that involve the attribution of the
rights or duties of one juridical entity to another for the special purposes of
the litigation at hand. Consequently, the attribution of jurisdiction in cases
of statutory merger or de facto merger should not present any constitutional
issues.
Mere continuation. This theory of successorship applies to those cases
where neither ownership nor economic realities have changed in the
reemergence of the predecessor's business in the form of the successor.
Successorship theory treats the transfer as an illusory shuffling of corporate
forms without substantive significance or change in the juridical entity. This
very much resembles the attribution of jurisdiction in reliance on traditional
"piercing the veil jurisprudence." The courts agree that jurisdiction over a
subsidiary (or parent) corporation will provide the basis for the assertion of
jurisdiction over its parent (or subsidiary) corporation if the interrelationship
between the two is so intertwined as to satisfy "piercing" requirements.2 2
For the purposes of the litigation, the two related corporations are treated as
one juridical unit.223 So long as the party being subjected to jurisdiction
through piercing the veil has its own day in court in which to challenge its
"alter ego" status, no constitutional question arises.224
The fusion of the juridical identities of predecessor and successor
provides a ready justification to support the constitutionality of the assertion
of in personam jurisdiction based on successorship under the merger and
221. Successorship's as a consequence of statutory or "de facto" merger is the result of
"universally accepted principle[s] of private corporation law." Anspec Co. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991).
222. See BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 40, at chs. 3-5.
223. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 443, 702 P.2d 601 (1985); see
BLUMBERG, COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 40, § 6.07.
224. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 111 (1969).
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mere continuation theories. This crucial element is entirely lacking under the
other traditional theories, that is, those relying on express or implied
assumption, or the inequitable or unlawful conduct of the successor under
state corporate distribution or insolvency law. In these cases, the predecessor
and successor are not the same juridical entities. Some other basis for
constitutionality must be found.
Equity jurisprudence. Assertion of successorship status under principles
of equity jurisprudence rests on the traditional power of the equity courts to
prevent frauds or to deny legal consequences to sham transactions. As in the
piercing the veil cases, equitable intervention exists to protect the court's
jurisdiction and prevent subversion of the legal system. The assertion of
jurisdiction rests on the inherent power of equity courts to restrain fraud.
Thus, it has been suggested that the rationale for asserting jurisdiction based
on successorship is that it is necessary to prevent a corporation from fleeing
the jurisdiction and changing its name in order to avoid a long-arm assertion
of jurisdiction. Assertion of jurisdiction is constitutional so long as the party
being subjected to jurisdiction has had a hearing.225
Assumption of liabilities. Successorship arises wherever the successor
has expressly or by implication assumed the liabilities of the predecessor,
including the obligation asserted by the plaintiff. The successor's legal
obligations flow from contract not relational law, and there does not appear
to be any basis for distinguishing this manifestation of contract law from
jurisdictional problems in other contract cases. One thing should be clear.
The mere fact of the existence of successorship for substantive purposes
under this theory does not provide an automatic basis for the assertion of
jurisdiction any more than it does in any other contract case. Serious
constitutional questions, therefore, arise.
In a case seeking to apply successorship doctrines in a contract action,
an Alabama court, seeking to justify the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation without other links to the forum because of the foreign
corporation's assumption of the liabilities of a domestic corporation, has
offered an explanation.226 It asserted that an assumption cannot deprive the
other contracting parties of the jurisdictional benefits obtained from the
22contract. 27 However much this may support the continued assertion of
jurisdiction over the predecessor corporation, it is questionable whether this
argument has any application to the successor.
The assumption undertaking, itself, may well provide a basis for the
assertion of direct, not attributive, jurisdiction over the successor. Long-arm
225. See City of Richmond, 918 F.2d at 454 (Virginia law); Inter-Americas Ins., 757 F.
Supp. at 1213.
226. Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1984).
227. Id.
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statutes typically provide for assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state
contracting parties under certain circumstances, which the facts of the
particular case may satisfy. Thus, in the closely related area of corporate
contractual guaranties, a number of courts have concluded that the undertak-
ing of a guaranty is sufficient to provide the basis for the constitutional
assertion of long-arm jurisdiction by the state in which the debtor is located
over an out-of-state guarantor without other links to the forum. However,
other courts have rejected this contention.22
Modern innovative doctrines. When one moves from the traditional
successorship doctrines to the modem continuity of the enterprise and product
line doctrines, none of the above foundations for attribution of jurisdiction
are available. If the relationship between successor and predecessor is legally
recognized for substantive purposes, and the predecessor's obligations are
attributed to the successor, does that also mean that the predecessor's contacts
with the forum also are attributed to the successor for purposes of satisfying
the constitutional prerequisites for assertion of jurisdiction? No case, thus
far, has actually asserted jurisdiction based on attribution of jurisdiction in
reliance on either the product line or continuity of the enterprise doctrines.
The assertion of jurisdiction in this manner without discussion of the
lurking constitutional problems presents an important problem with the courts
appearing to forge into new jurisprudential ground. The policy consider-
ations leading to attribution of substantive liability are very different from
those involved in determining whether the assertion of constitutionality is
constitutional. Some other foundation, if available, must be found.
The relationship between the predecessor corporation and the forum
dramatically affects this problem. Thus, if the predecessor's assets that were
acquired by the successor are located in the forum, these would readily
provide the basis for assertion of direct, not attributive, jurisdiction over the
successor. Where, however, the forum's jurisdiction over the predecessor
rests on factors unrelated to the assets transferred to the successor, such as
the predecessor's state of incorporation or qualification to do business, the
assertion of jurisdiction as a derivative consequence of the relationship would
push the application of relational law to its furthest extreme. It would
present serious questions under the Due Process provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment that have not yet been answered.
228. Compare Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1992); Barclays
Leasing, Inc. v. National Business Sys., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 184 (W.D.N.C. 1990), and Marcus
Food Co. v. Family Foods of Tallahassee, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 753, 760-61 (D. Kan. 1990)
(jurisdiction recognized), with AM Diagnostics, Inc. v. Denney, 810 F. Supp. 887, 893 (E.D.
Mich. 1993); Dacourt Group, Inc. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Conn.
1990) (jurisdiction rejected).
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XlI. SUCCESSORSHIP LIABILITY AND INTRAGROUP TORT LIABILITY
Most of the cases considering the imposition of intragroup liability in
connection with the successor liability of a group affiliate give no indication
that the involvement of the components of a corporate group makes any
difference in the approach or the outcome. Thus, in the cases that have
arisen, the courts, with one exception, have uniformly refused to impose
liability on a parent corporation for the successor liability that was being
imposed on its subsidiary.
In Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, the Supreme Court of Alabama
imposed successor product liability on a subsidiary corporation that continued
to manufacture a product line under its predecessor's name.229 At the same
time, it refused to impose liability upon the parent of the successor subsidiary
where the subsidiary operated as a separate business.230 In Bonee v. L &
M Construction Chemicals, the court upheld a product liability complaint
stating a cause of action against a subsidiary as a successor corporation under
the continuity of the enterprise theory.23' This court also refused to impose
intragroup tort liability on the parent corporation simply on the basis of the
plaintiff's allegations of the parent's 100% stock ownership of the successor
subsidiary and the existence of interlocking directors.232
More recently, Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. involved a product liability
complaint against a parent and a subsidiary for successor liability of the
subsidiary, allegedly arising from an implied assumption of liabilities.2 33
The court refused to dismiss the complaint against the parent where the
parent had negotiated the acquisition of the predecessor manufacturing
company, the subsidiary had no assets other than the right to receive the
predecessor's assets, and the parent and subsidiary had some common
officers and directors.2' However, the court rejected imposition of liability
under the mere continuation doctrine. 35
In Turner v. Wean United, Inc., the plaintiff sought to impose successor
liability on a sister corporation of the predecessor manufacturer under the
continuity of the enterprise standard.236 In holding that the doctrine was
inapplicable on the facts, the court dismissed the fact that sister subsidiaries
229. Matrix-Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 782.
230. Id. at 788.
231. 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
232. Id. at 383.
233. 698 F. Supp. 535 (D. Del. 1988).
234. Id. at 542.
235. Id.
236. 531 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 1988).
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were involved.237 The court stated that the existence of common control,
however relevant for imposition of intragroup liability in reliance on
"piercing the veil" or the de facto merger doctrine, was irrelevant for
consideration of continuity of the enterprise successor liability.238
Similarly, in Schnoor v. Deitchler, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship in a product liability
litigation did not expand the exposure to liability.239 As in other areas,
liability could be imposed on the parent for the product liability of its
subsidiary only upon satisfaction of all the requirements of piercing the
veil.24°
In Diaz v. South Bend Lathe Co., a parent acquired a business and
subsequently transferred it to a subsidiary.24' The parent was held a
successor company to the seller in reliance on the concept of de facto
merger.242 In a product liability case, the plaintiff sued the subsidiary.24 3
The court dismissed the complaint.2 " It held that the subsidiary was not
subject to successorship liability as well as the parent where the parent was
still in business, thereby presenting an available remedy for the plaintiff.
245
Several commentators have suggested that, as a stratagem to limit
successor liability, acquiring corporations should accomplish acquisitions
through subsidiaries rather than directly.246 The usefulness of this sugges-
tion is supported by the overwhelming rejection of successor liability in the
foregoing cases.247  The question remains, however, whether in the future
entity law and the limited exception provided by rigorous traditional piercing
jurisprudence will withstand the urgent pressures to provide the injured
plaintiff with a remedy in product liability matters or pressures of the
government in its effort to achieve full implementation of the underlying
policies and objectives of remedial statutory programs such as CERCLA. As
237. Id. at 831.
238. Id. at 827.
239. 482 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1992).
240. Id.
241. 707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (New York law).
242. Id. at 102.
243. Id. at 100.
244. Id. at 104.
245. Id. at 103.
246. See Ann Rae Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions,
34 Bus. LAW. 489, 498 (1979); Michael G. Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of
Seller's Products Liabilities in Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1978).
But see Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 717 (1985) (stating that
use of subsidiaries would "externalize risks to victims" and should not be permitted).
247. But cf Electric Power Bd. v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d
522, 527 (Tenn. 1985) (imposing intragroup tort liability and noting that subsidiary was
separately incorporated to insulate the parent from product liability).
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is evident, such pressures have been responsible for the growth of successor
liability doctrines in the first place.
It should be obvious that successor liability will apply to transactions
between related corporations as well as between unrelated sellers and
purchasers. Thus, in Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., the court imposed
successor liability on one subsidiary that had continued the asbestos mining
business of another subsidiary within the same group.248 In Schmoll v.
ACANDS, Inc., a district court similarly imposed successor product liability
on a new holding company emerging from a corporate reconstruction, in
which lucrative nonasbestos-related activities were spun off to another group
affiliate while the remaining asbestos-related assets were sold to another
corporation.249 The court invoked traditional "piercing the veil jurispru-
dence" to disregard such corporate restructuring in attempting to avoid
liability.250  The traditional successorship doctrines have been widely
applied in cases involving intragroup transfers. In a suit to recover CERCLA
costs, the court held that where a court has acquired jurisdiction and venue
over the predecessor corporation, it retained jurisdiction and venue over the
successor in order to prevent evasion of judgments by corporate manipuila-
tion.25'
XIII. SUCCESSORSHIP LIABILITY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
A creditor's assertion of a claim against a successorship corporation in
the bankruptcy proceedings of the predecessor presents interesting questions
of choice of law and statutory preemption in the federal system.1 2 Under
bankruptcy principles, the bankruptcy court must turn to applicable state law
in order to determine the validity of a claim and the existence of the property
interests of the debtor estate.253 This reference to state law inevitably
248. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aJfd 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985).
249. 703 F. Supp. 868, 874 (D. Or. 1988); see In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1123, 1126-27 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (holding company subject to suit
for liabilities of predecessor company that through a merger became part of one of the holding
company's subsidiaries, notwithstanding the holding company's transfer of liabilities to
subsidiary).
250. Schmoll, 703 F. Supp. at 874.
251. United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated
without op., 855 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1988).
252. See generally Michael H. Reed, Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales, 51 Bus.
LAW. 653 (1996).
253. For determination of the existence of property interests, federal courts turn to state
law. E.g., United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960) (tax); Commissioner
v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); Wolfe v. United
States, 798 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1926), amended, 806 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986); AvcoDelta
Corp. Can. Ltd. v. United States, 540 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1976); see also BLUMBERG,
SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 40, § 24.05.
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includes state concepts of successorship liability.
However, the bankruptcy law generally preempts state law insofar as
implementation of plans of reorganization and other post-petition judicially
approved dispositions of the debtor's assets are concerned. Among other
matters, this means that the bankruptcy court may bar any assertion of
successor liability against the judicially approved transferee, such as the
purchaser of the assets of a debtor at a foreclosure sale or the reorganized
corporation emerging from a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. 2"
Similarly, a bankruptcy court has the power to provide that a purchaser shall
take control free of successor liability under the preexisting collective
bargaining agreements of the debtor.2' 5 However, the mere fact that the
transfer of assets was pursuant to the bankruptcy sale does not "absolutely
preclude" successor liability.
256
With the confirmation of the reorganization plan, however, the bankrupt-
cy court loses its jurisdiction over the reorganized debtor. Accordingly, a
purchaser of the debtor's assets will be subject to any successor liability for
claims arising after confirmation.5 7 Whether such preemption is confined
to reorganization proceedings is not entirely clear. The federal courts have
divided.258 The courts, refusing to recognize successorship liability under
such circumstances, have been motivated by pragmatic as well as doctrinal
considerations. They have been unwilling to recognize such successorship
liability because of the concern that recognition under these circumstances
would force down the price receivable by the bankrupt estate from the sale
of the debtor's assets and thus, undermine the priorities of the bankruptcy
code. At least one state court has held that unlike bankruptcy reorganization
procedures, a bankruptcy plan of liquidation does not give rise to pre-
211
emption.
In addition to the treatment of successorship in bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy proceedings have an impact on subsequent common law actions
seeking to assert successorship status on the transferee of the debtor's assets.
254. E.g., In re White Motor Credit Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc., 75 B.R. 944
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (injunction against state product liability suit on preconfirmation
claim).
Contra Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 237 N.J. Super. 282, 567 A.2d 598 (1989)
(reaching a different conclusion in liquidation cases).
255. In re New England Fish Co., 19 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982).
256. See Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, & Warehouse Workers Union (Independent)
Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 48 (7th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Chicago Truck
Drivers Pension].
257. In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 730 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1984); Renkiewicz v. Allied
Prods. Corp., 196 Mich. App. 309, 492 N.W.2d 820 (1992)
258. See Reed, supra note 252, at 671.
259. Wilkerson, 237 N.J. Super. at 567. But see Chicago Truck Drivers Pension, 59 F.3d
at 51 (holding that bankruptcy sale does not absolutely preclude successor liability).
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For those courts emphasizing not only the unavailability of a remedy against
the predecessor but also the causal relationship between transferee's purchase
and the liquidation and dissolution of the predecessor, the fact that the
transfer and the dissolution of the debtor occurred as part of the intervening
bankruptcy proceedings eliminates the necessary causal relation. As noted,
for such courts, this bars successorship liability.
260
The doctrinal conditions for application of successor liability under a
particular doctrine form a final barrier to sales after bankruptcy has
intervened. Thus, a California court held that liability under the product line
doctrine could not be imposed upon the purchaser of a debtor-manufacturer's
assets from a bankruptcy trustee. 261 The court noted that the acquisition
after bankruptcy had not caused the destruction of the worker's remedy.
262
XIV. CONCLUSION
Successor liability from its early roots in corporation law has emerged to
become a major aspect of product liability law. The problems associated
with an increasingly complex and technologically advanced industrial society
have presented powerful pressures. In response, two innovative, judicial
doctrines have expanded the outer perimeters of the traditional doctrines of
successorship law applied throughout U.S. jurisprudence. These doctrines
resting on principles of relational law are the product line doctrine and the
continuity of the enterprise doctrine.
While originally formulated in connection with product liability matters,
the continuity doctrine, in particular, appears to be outgrowing its origins in
tort law and has spread to other areas. It has been prominently applied in
areas of statutory law, particularly for purposes of labor relations,
antidiscrimination, and employment laws through its variant, the integrated
enterprise doctrine and for CERCLA as well. In addition, it has been widely
applied in determining the amenability of a successor to the assertion of
jurisdiction based on the contacts of the predecessor.
Thus, successor liability is already a prominent feature in product
liability, labor and employment statutory law, environmental law, and
amenability to jurisdiction. Although the process of expanding successor
liability in this manner to other areas is in its early stages, the number of
cases that have made use of the doctrine across the full spectrum of U.S. law
is already impressive. The doctrine may no longer be viewed solely as an
260. See Nelson v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 778 F.2d 533, 538 (9th Cir. 1985); White Motor,
75 B.R. at 944.
261. Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 4th 190, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669
(1991).
262. Id. at 200.
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aspect of product liability law. It clearly has won acceptance in other areas.
However, the implications are still mixed.
Although some aspects of the imposition of successor liability may be
readily understood as the application of traditional principles of law, the
imposition of successor liability under such circumstances as those involved
in the continuity of the enterprise theory appears to reflect a significant
jurisprudential development.263 The responsibility of such a successor
corporation for acts of its predecessor that have given rise to common law
or statutory liability cannot be explained by traditional doctrines of
corporation law or equity jurisprudence. It does not rest on the contract,
consent, or act of the successor. It arises out of the successor's economic
role in conducting the same business supported by so many of the same
physical and human instrumentalities that a substantial economic identity
exists between the two. Liability follows the business, and the successor is
liable because of its status as the continuing operator of the business, which
under its predecessor was responsible for the plaintiff's loss or statutory
violation. This is another illustration of the growing acceptance of relational
law in commercial areas.
The continuity of the enterprise doctrine has gained a wide area of
acceptance in U.S. law, but this acceptance has been limited to special areas
where public pressure to provide a remedy for victims is particularly strong.
Product liability and statutory liability, particularly under the labor relations,
antidiscrimination, and employment statutes and CERCLA, are the very best
examples of areas where it has been applied. However, even in these areas,
the continuity doctrine has not won general acceptance. In product liability,
it remains a minority doctrine. Although the continuity of the enterprise
doctrine in the form of the integrated enterprise concept has been generally
accepted for purposes of labor relations, antidiscrimination, and employment
law, CERCLA presents a somewhat different picture. While the continuity
doctrine has been adopted by a majority of courts for purposes of successor
liability under CERCLA, it remains highly controversial, with a vigorous
minority of the courts rejecting its application. Other areas of acceptance are
very limited.
The significant adoption of successorship as the basis for the attribution
of legal rights and responsibility in numerous areas of common and statutory
law from one party to a related party is an important example of another area
in which U.S. law has embraced enterprise principles and ajurisprudence that
rests on relational law. However, when one moves from the traditional types
of successorship status to the modem concepts, expanding the outer
263. Readers are reminded that while the doctrines have won acceptance in numerous
jurisdictions, they been rejected in many others and unmistakably represent the minority view.
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boundaries of liability to include cases lacking continuity of ownership, the
picture changes. The mixed success of the product line and continuity of the
enterprise doctrines, even in those areas in which the courts would be most
inclined to be receptive, demonstrates that the continued expansion of the
doctrines in the foreseeable future is open to question.
